Composite Domination and State Formation, 1650–1700
Manorialism and the Fiscal-Financial-Military Constitution in Habsburg Bohemia

STEPHAN SANDER-FAES

Introduction

Early modern Europe was not a peaceful place, and much of its history is marred by seemingly incessant conflict. For much of this history, warfare was indeed characterised by confessional and political motives. With the benefit of hindsight, scholarship identified a gradual, but non-linear, shift that occurred over the course of the seventeenth century and which informs many periodisation efforts across disciplinary boundaries, be they the English Civil War (1642–1651) and its consequences for the British isles, the Thirty Years’ War and the Westphalian settlement (1618–1648), or the triumph of monarchical authority over rebellious factions in Bohemia (1618–1620) and France, the so-called Fronde (1648–1653). In all these contexts we note similarities as well as discrepancies, but the bellicosity of Europe’s monarchs and their trusted councillors did not wane. To the contrary, “the capricious ambition of kings and ministers” was matched by the establishment of increasingly intricate fiscal-financial arrangements that were put into place by them to pay for these wars. Most of these adjustments, despite outward appearances and ex-post interpretations, came about in hap-hazard ways and conveyed intended as well as unintended consequences that shaped early modern state formation over time. Geopolitical competition fed into the establishment and growth over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

1 Topographical information follows Anglophone conventions with respect to Central Europe: for place-names, besides those generally familiar such as Vienna or Prague, I am using their historical (mostly German) toponyms, with the addition of their current (Czech) name on the first mention. The results that are not entirely consistent and at times frankly unsatisfactory, but at the same time this increases the chances to locate these places on contemporary maps. To increase readability, whenever possible I have used the English equivalents of personal names (e.g., Charles VI instead of Karl VI.) where known; all second names are reproduced as they appear in the sources. Similarly, I have translated all quotes and added the original wording only in those instances where the argument warrants it; in addition, I added the respective references where full transliterations of the original source text is freely available. All dates are New Style, as this – our current – calendrical norm was adopted in the Habsburg monarchy in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. Cf. Robert John Weston Evans, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1550–1700. An Interpretation, Oxford 1979, p. xiii–xv; Peter George Muir Dickson, Finance and Government under Maria Theresia, 1740–1780, Oxford 1987, vol. 1, p. xix.

teenth centuries of standing and sitting armies – soldiers and bureaucrats – which in turn led to another sequence of gradual, equally non-linear, feedback loops that are considered the explanation for both these dynamics of administrative-militaristic thickening as well as the drastic reduction of the number of sovereign states in the period leading up to the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815). In its most enduring, and perhaps also its most famous, formulation, Charles Tilly held that “[w]ar made the state, and the state made war”, noting that it was this most destructive of human endeavours that “wove the European network of national states, and preparation of war created the internal structures of the states within it”. On these general trends economists, historians, political scientists, and sociologists are all in agreement.

Out of this consensus, reached across disciplinary boundaries by the end of the Cold War, emerged the interpretation that, all other things being equal, the most successful case of early modern state formation was the Anglo-British union. Building on decades of scholarship and carefully considering London’s competitors across the Channel, John Brewer’s The Sinews of Power constitutes a historiographical watershed. Endorsing P.G.M. Dickson’s findings on the role and importance of credit for the British war efforts during the eighteenth century, Brewer argued that the growth of

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public debt – and Britain’s continued credit-worthiness – was contingent on regular taxation, which underwrote government borrowing. It was this set of fiscal–financial arrangements that conferred upon Britain’s leading politicians the comparative advantage of more reliable and credible debt service: after the Glorious Revolution (1688), London’s interest payments were no longer exclusively dependent on the capricious whims of any one monarch. To the contrary, the British body politic, assembled in Parliament, underwrote these loans, which allowed them to emerge victoriously from the “Second Hundred Years’ War” against France over the course of the eighteenth century.5 With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the evolving British “fiscal–military state” was more resilient than its continental peer competitor, France, but it proved equally intrusive and heavy-handed when “judged by the criteria of the ability to take pounds out of people’s pockets and to put soldiers in the field and sailors on the high seas.”6 In other words: Parliamentary Britain beat its more autocratic rival at their own game, and we will return to this point in due course.

Taking note of the rich historiography spawned by Brewer’s argument, this essay is an attempt to investigate, “how certain forms of centralized and local power interact[ed] with one another” to more even-handedly assess the emergence of the fiscal–military state. Contemporaries and present-day scholars alike were (are) aware of the implications and consequences of the establishment of standing and sitting armies, yet at the same time we are reminded that there is neither a “clear trajectory or unbending path” nor “a consistent salience” of such fiscal–military states.7 Acknowledging these facts, we note the “experimental” or


7 This was noted already in ibidem, p. xviii; the quotes above are from John Brewer, Revisiting The Sinews of Power, in: A. Graham – P. Walsh (edd.), British Fiscal–Military States, p. 27–34, here p. 34, where the author himself uses the proverbial “Cheshire cat” to make this point; cf. further Joanna Innes, Not so strange? New Views of Eighteenth-Century England, History Workshop 29, 1990, p. 179–183, especially p. 181; do not miss the recent reflections pertaining to the British state by Colin Kidd – Malcolm Petrie, Our National Hedge-Podge, in: London Review of Books 39, 2017, p. 36–38, who, in the context of Brexit, likened it to a “hodge-podge”.

OPERA HISTORICA • ROČNÍK 19 • 2018 • č. 2

153
“procedural” dynamics of such fiscal-financial arrangements across early modern Europe, which certainly call into question any clear-cut, quick, and unambiguous interpretations of state formation. Given the current state of research – a very uneven historiography that, in general, approaches early modern state formation from the one-point perspective of the centre, in addition to the geographic scope tilting towards Europe’s most successful examples (especially Britain and France, and to a somewhat lesser degree the Dutch Republic, the Spanish monarchy, and Prussia) – this essay pursues two rather different aims: on the one hand, assessing state formation means to study “a network of power relationships which become institutionalized to a greater or lesser extent over time”, we find that these processes emanate “from the local and particular rather than from the top down”; at the same time, the following investigation into the “complex relations between the varied bodies that made up the fractured polity of the eighteenth-century [state]” breaks new ground in studying these dynamics in the context of the Habsburg monarchy around 1700 on the other hand, thereby expanding these discussions to Central Europe.

These themes are pursued by, first, integrating the Austrian monarchy into the current debates on early modern state formation, focusing on the under-studied period between the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) and the accession of Charles VI (r. 1711–1740). These decades witnessed Austria’s emergence as a great power, cemented into place Vienna’s hegemony over Central Europe, and saw the establishment of the first pan-European balance of power that lasted until the First World War. Using the example of Bohemia, arguably the Habsburgs’ own “metropolitan province”, I will then, second, approach the subject matter with a number of examples drawn from the rich, but equally under-used archives of the Eggenberg domains centred around Krumau (Český Krumlov). Since the

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10 Term and concept of the “metropolitan province” derives from the debates about the roles of Ireland and Scotland within the British fiscal-military states; it denotes, in Andrew Mackillop’s words, “a constitutionally, politically and socio-economically distinctive society within the [composite Habsburg monarchy] which integrated, but did not fully assimilate, with the [neighbouring Austrian] state and society which formed the foundation of the wider [Austrian] fiscal-military complex.” See Huw V. Bowen, *Elites, Enterprise, and the Making of the British Overseas Empire, 1688–1775,*
late Middle Ages, these territories formed a relatively large – in all c. 390 square kilometres (about the size of St Vincent and the Grenadines and a good deal larger than Malta) – and comparatively contiguous territorial agglomeration, and its respective owners – the Rožmberk (13th century to around 1602), the Eggenberg (1623–1719), and Schwarzenberg (1723–1948/49) – were among the most powerful lords in the Bohemian lands. The third and final part of this essay assesses the pertinent question of the consequences of fiscal-financial integration via extraordinary wartime measures, in particular addressing the entanglements between local, regional, and supra-regional instances as well as their social and political consequences. In other words: was the emergence of the Austrian variety of a powerful fiscal-financial-military regime in the centre accompanied by similar developments in its periphery? The reconstruction of the events and developments is based on the extensive tax-related records preserved in the State Regional Archives in Český Krumlov. In the final part, I am going to address the wider implications of the findings and propose a way forward to conceptualise the crucial, but usually under-estimated, role of domination, or Herrschaft, which potentially consisted of any number of property titles, in the processes that characterised early modern state formation.

Benchmarks: State Formation à l’autrichienne

With the benefit of hindsight, the publication of The Sinews of Power (1989)....


This study is based on the tax records of the Eggenberg domains, preserved in the Státní oblastní archiv [State Regional Archive] Treboň, oddělení [Satellite Office] Český Krumlov (hence SOA Treboň, oddělení Český Krumlov), Vrchní úřad – česká generálía [Seignorial directorate –Bohemian Documents] (hence Vů – čg), sign. I 4L α, fasc. 62, 63, 64, and 65; this extensive documentation is complemented with some additional materials such as the resolutions passed by the kingdom’s diet; further commentary on the sources and the archival situation provided by Stephan Sander-Faes, Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit. Böhmen und die Habsburgermonarchie vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis Karl VI., Zürich 2017 (Habilitationsschrift), p. 61–65.
constitutes a historiographical watershed of the first order for British history. Across the Channel, however, the full scale of Brewer’s arguments was at first obscured by the impact of Nicholas Henshall’s *The Myth of Absolutism* (1992) that almost immediately enthralled, albeit rather selectively, most early modernists in western Europe. Engendering lively debates, around the turn of the millennium many French and German historians concluded that “absolutism” had outlived its usefulness as a heuristic device. With no clear replacement in sight, Continental historians embraced the Cultural Turn and instead proposed that the early modern state was, above all, characterised by “cooperation” within, and “consensus” among, the ruling elites, which explained the limits of monarchical authority.

These discussions resulted in three interrelated, but also somewhat contradictory, conceptual and historiographical trends: first, whereas most French and German historians were quick to cast aside both concept and term of “absolutism”, there is now a growing unease, and a number of scholars are open about re-introducing it.


Within German-language historiography, second, these debates fed into a number of interpretations of state formation (or the lack thereof) that eventually touched upon the latent, and still open-ended, question of the Holy Roman Empire’s statehood; in all, these gave rise to two to three more or less different approaches, all of which are dealing with communication while differing to some degree in terms of the “systemic” nature of the interactions among the various protagonists. Here we note that these discussions were, third, mainly conducted within, and with respect to, the borders of present-day Germany, which means these debates did not initially not include the Habsburg monarchy. While this was criticised at the time, and

rightly so, by Ronald Asch, Harm Klueting, and others, it took about a decade before this omission was remedied.\(^\text{18}\)

As of this writing, the unintended consequences of these developments point yet into another direction. Recent trends and current interpretations of European cultural, political, and social evolution are indicative of an interesting terminological (re-) convergence, clearly visible through the addition of the qualifier “Baroque” to “absolutism” when speaking about early modern France, many German lands, and the Habsburg monarchy.\(^\text{19}\) This might either open a backdoor through which “absolutism”, qualified or not, is going to re-enter the debate, as it already did in the Czech case; on the other hand, it might also lead scholarship to the development of a different and perhaps even more plausible alternative in the future, which will, hopefully, go beyond the traditional court-centric and/or estates-and-diet-focused, one-point perspectives that characterise most of these approaches.\(^\text{20}\)


\(^{20}\) The basis for the Czech interpretation is R. Evans, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 195–234; consequently, Czech historiography now uses the term “Baroque Absolutism”, first introduced by Josef...
This essay, by contrast, approaches one of historiography’s late-comers to these debates, the Habsburg monarchy, based on two distinctively different premises: first, individual actions and structural developments convey different—and differing—consequences for central institutions vis-à-vis those occurring contemporaneously in administratively and geographically remote areas, that is, in the periphery. It follows, second, that state integration, understood as an human-made, but elite-driven, dynamic emanating from the centre of power, is accompanied by countervailing and at times opposing trends and pressures whose consequences may or may not increase with geographical distance. Warfare, above all, concentrates decision-making and influence in the hands of a limited number of individuals and institutions while non-essential considerations (temporarily) recede. Armed conflict thus gave rise to a certain kind of state formation, which was accompanied by various degrees of disintegration and loss of cohesion outside the corridors of power.

In short, this essay explores, how, as the...
Habsburg monarchy’s protagonists tried to cope with war-induced stresses around the turn of the eighteenth century, their actions started to tear apart the administrative and social fabric that held society together. Recognition of these consequences suggests that once one leaves the corridors of power, there are different stories to explore. Studying the same events and developments “on the ground” thus allows us to formulate tentative answers to the pertinent question “how certain forms of centralized and local power interact with one another”, to which we now turn.

War and Consequence in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1650 to c. 1700

Over the course of the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), Bohemia changed drastically. The Estates’ revolt, defeated at White Mountain in 1620, was followed by large-scale redistributions of property, and the longer the conflict dragged on, the higher the damages the country and its inhabitants had to endure. When the dust finally settled, the Bohemian Lands had lost about a third of their people and large areas, especially in the fertile central regions, were most severely affected.

While most extraordinary wartime measures were gradually abrogated over the course of the early 1650s, a return to the status quo ante appeared all but impossible. Consequently, crown and estates collaborated closely to reorganise the kingdom’s tax administration, which after a multi-year effort yielded a new cadastre, the so-called Berní rula, or Steuerrolle. Promulgated in 1656 and


25 J. Brewer, Revisiting The Sinews of Power, p. 34.

revised in the late 1670s and early 1680s, it contained the numbers *osedlý*, or *Ange-sessene*, per territorial unit; these fictitious 'units of account' were used to determine the more or less exact tax burden that fell onto each individual lordship and its various constituent territorial (sub-) units, that included, but were not limited to, other lordships, incorporated ecclesiastical or secular territories, cities, bailiwicks, villages, and even individual farms.27 The fictitious nature of these 'units of account' is further underscored by the fact that before the large-scale rewriting of the cadastre, the so-called "first Theresian cadastre", which was compiled over the course of the first half of the eighteenth century, the number of *osedlý* bore no relation whatsoever to agricultural output, demographic changes, and economic hardship because of bad weather conditions, natural disasters such as the Great Frost (1708–09), or war-induced fiscal pressures.28

Akin to the 'constitutional' renewal, effectuated in 1627/28 in the wake of the Habsburg–Catholic victory at White Mountain, the ensuing decades were characterised by change on many levels:29 during the second half of the seventeenth century, in particular from

27 The standard treatment remains Josef Pekař, *České katastry, 1654–1789*. Se zvláštním zřetelem k dějinám hospodářským a ústavním, Prague 1932, p. 4–56, see also p. 57–100 for a synthetic overview of Bohemian fiscal history; see also Petr Mařá, "Unertträgliche Praegavation". Steuererhebung und Militärfinanzierung im Königreich Böhmen vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis zum Regierungsantritt Maria Theresias, in: Peter Rauscher (ed.), Kriegsführung und Staatsfinanzen. Die Habsburgermonarchie und das Heilige Römische Reich vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis zum Ende des habsburgischen Kaisertums 1740, Münster 2010 (= Geschichte in der Epoche Karls V. 10), p. 139–185, especially p. 157–183; Jean Bérenger, *Les Habsbourg et l’argent de la renaissance aux lumières*, Paris 2014 (= Collection du Centre Roland Mousnier 64), p. 249–302, which is a revised version of his earlier publication (*Finances et absolutisme autrichien dans la seconde moitié du 17e siècle*, Paris 1975) on which I have relied as well; most recently Jan Lhoták, *Organizace poddanské kontribuce v Čechách a její působení v 18. a první polovině 19. století*, Archivní časopis 67, 2017, p. 177–207; the original of the tax cadastre is preserved in the National Archives and subject to ongoing, but non-continuous, edition efforts since 1949; for this essay’s purposes, note especially the two vols. on the Bechyně circle (Bechiner Kreis, or Bechynský kraj) by Iva Čadková – Magda Zahradníková (edd.), *Kraj Bechynský, I–II*, Praha 2013 (= Berní rula 4–5); see further the general register, incl. a glossary and bibliographic guidance, by Václav Červený – Jarmla Červená (edd.), *Berní rula. Generální rejstřík ke všem svazkům (vydaným i dosud nevydaným) berní ruly z roku 1654 doplněný (tam, kde se nedochovály) o soubor poddaných z roku 1651, I–II*, Prague 2003 (= Berní rula, Generální rejstřík).


29 On the 'constitutional' change, the so-called Renewed Land Ordinance(s) in Bohemia and Moravia, see the texts in Hermenegild Jireček (ed.), *Constitutiones Regni Bohemiae anno 1627 reformatae*, Praha 1888 (= Codex juris Bohemici 5, 2); on the legal implications see Lutz Rentzow,
the 1670s onwards, Bohemian taxes became increasingly differentiated as both the monthly military tax, or Contribution, and many other military and non-military levies were specifically earmarked for purposes that ranged from extraordinary war taxation to more regular sums for the fortifications of Prague and Eger (Cheb) to the salaries of officials throughout the country to wedding presents, all payable on specified dates. These characteristics remained essentially unaltered until the reforms under Maria Theresa, yet this briefest of sketches allows us to recognise the dynamics of the Habsburg monarchy's fiscal-financial regime during the period under consideration here. As time went on, the emperor engaged in more wars that, at the same time, became ever more costly, which is mirrored by the appropriations of the Bohemian diet that grew from between 300,000 to 500,000 fl. in the 1650s to between 1.8 m (1697/98) to 2.3 m fl. (1700), in other words: an increase by a factor of four to six over the course of a mere half-century, depending on the available data.

Data gleaned from the tax records of the Eggenberg domains in southern Bohemia, are equally fragmentary, which is particularly true for the third quarter of the seventeenth century, but there are much more reliable records for the “Great Turkish War” (1683–1699). As far as I was able to reconstruct their tax history, the main difference between these periods derives from the somewhat diverging receipts recorded in Krumau and what (little) we know for sure about...
the overall tax grants by the kingdom’s diet during the third quarter of the seventeenth century; from around 1680, the data suggest a closer correlation between these two points of reference; Figure 1, which covers the periods from 1657 to 1669 and from 1682 to 1701, provides the following details as compiled by Eggenberg’s officials a few years after these periods: the total sums paid by the duchy of Krumau, which includes payments by Eggenberg, his subjects, and a number of places (the eponymous city, a few market towns, and some bailiwicks that were themselves proprietors), broken down into the monthly military tax, or Contribution, all other taxes, and the number of individual tax grants per year. In addition, I have added the number of osedlý, or Angesessene, which was used by the Royal Tax Office (königliches Oberssteuer-Amt, or královský úřad berničný) in Prague and the circle administrators in Bechin (Bechyně) as well as the average amount of fl. per osedlý and year, all based on these data.32

Figure 1: Eggenberg’s Tax History, 1657–1669, 1682–1701

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Σa</th>
<th>Contributionb</th>
<th>Terminsteuernc</th>
<th>Osedld</th>
<th>ø osedl/yeara</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1657</td>
<td>18,130</td>
<td>18,130</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2,622 ¾</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1658</td>
<td>35,538</td>
<td>17,788</td>
<td>17,750</td>
<td>2,538 ¼</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>1659</td>
<td>29,837</td>
<td>22,025</td>
<td>7,812</td>
<td>2,548 ½</td>
<td>11 ½</td>
</tr>
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<td>1660</td>
<td>34,487</td>
<td>22,470</td>
<td>12,017</td>
<td>2,576 ¾</td>
<td>13 ½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>32,080</td>
<td>9,961</td>
<td>2,594 ¾</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,526 ½</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>1663</td>
<td>44,724</td>
<td>32,442</td>
<td>12,282</td>
<td>2,548 ½</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1664</td>
<td>48,991</td>
<td>42,820</td>
<td>6,171</td>
<td>2,548 ½</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1665</td>
<td>47,070</td>
<td>21,014</td>
<td>26,056</td>
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<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1666</td>
<td>49,330</td>
<td>28,211</td>
<td>21,119</td>
<td>2,595 ¾</td>
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<tr>
<td>1667</td>
<td>22,959</td>
<td>22,959</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2,606 ¾</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1668</td>
<td>24,502</td>
<td>20,687</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>2,606 ¾</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1669</td>
<td>14,518</td>
<td>14,518</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2,595 ¼</td>
<td>5 ½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1682</td>
<td>23,415</td>
<td>21,867</td>
<td>1,548</td>
<td>2,630 ¾</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Here we note that some of the data was taken from (unfortunately undated) ex-post compilations dating, perhaps, from between 1674 and 1684 as well as 1701 to 1706, respectively, which refer to sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62 and 64, respectively, where I found these documents; I have surveyed all existing tax records between 1675 and 1710 (sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, 63, 64, 65) and tried, to the best of my abilities, to cross-check the data in the two ex-post compilations with the assignations and receipts; the above-mentioned reservations with respect to the data’s reliability apply as well, and it is further complicated by two large-scale efforts on part of the Schwarzenberg archivists, undertaken between 1793 and 1803 as well as after the abolition of serfdom in 1848, who are responsible for the existent archival organisation; further information as per S. Sander-Faes, Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit, 61–66.
<table>
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<td>15%</td>
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<td>4,603</td>
<td>1,511</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4,558</td>
<td>1,559</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>22,531</td>
<td>4,387</td>
<td>1,571</td>
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<td>30,988</td>
<td>12,244</td>
<td>1,607</td>
<td>19%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>30,922</td>
<td>12,862</td>
<td>1,607</td>
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<tr>
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<td>24,149</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>27%</td>
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<td>1695</td>
<td>45,831</td>
<td>27,371</td>
<td>1,581</td>
<td>29%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1696</td>
<td>41,576</td>
<td>22,966</td>
<td>1,604</td>
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<td>1697</td>
<td>44,831</td>
<td>25,927</td>
<td>1,612</td>
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<tr>
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<td>53,202</td>
<td>25,902</td>
<td>1,582</td>
<td>34%</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources: SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vá – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, 63, and 64, Overview of Taxes Paid, 1682–1701, Krumau, s.d.; adapted from S. Sander-FaeS, Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit, p. 196–197, 200, 203, 225–226; all monetary values in fl. Note that there are some gaps in the archival sources, which is visible in the absence of any Terminsteuern in the years 1667 and 1669; I have not found sources in Krumau for the period from 1670 to 1681.

(a) Annual totals consisting of monthly military taxes, or Kontribution, and all other tax positions, or Terminsteuern.
(b) Totals of the yearly contributions.
(c) Totals of the yearly Terminsteuern; note that this is a composite category in which, for analytical purposes all tax positions other than the contribution were aggregated; note further that this category consisted of a wide range, and over time changing number, of tax positions (here the data suggest more nuanced categorisation than that put forth by J. Pekař, České katastry, p. 24–6, more details on p. 57–100; and, writing in Pekař’s vein, also from P. Maťa, “Unerträgliche Praegravation”, p. 162–164) that I put together to assess the overall proportion between the contribution and the Terminsteuern.
(d) Number of osedlý, or Angesessene, used by Bohemian and circle officials to allocate the tax burden; see also (f).
(e) Average annual tax burden per osedlý, or Angesessene.
There are two sets of data in 1683 because of the revisions to the tax cadastre, which went into effect as of 1 October 1683, resulting in a reduction of the number of osedlý, or Angesessene, by about 40 percent throughout the Eggenberg domains and the corresponding increase in the average annualised tax burden per osedlý, or Angesessene.

As shown in Figure 1, there are two drastic spikes in tax receipts during the second half of the seventeenth century, and both are associated with warfare against the Ottoman empire in 1663/1664 and 1683–1699, respectively. Here we note that the former conflict, on the one hand, was both much shorter and it is less-extensively documented in the Eggenberg tax records, in turn rendering any clear-cut assumption, or interpretation, potentially problematic. The late-seventeenth century conflict, on the other hand, is different on several accounts: the archival documentation is much more reliable, it is considerably more extensive, and the “Great Turkish War” was also much longer, which suggests a more carefully calibrated tax regime was necessary. The result was an increase in fiscal-financial complexity, that is, Bohemia’s tax appropriations became more numerous, their individual characteristics grew more distinctive, and their administrative-procedural mechanisms increased as well, as illustrated by Figure 2.

Table: Eggenberg’s Taxes and the “Great Turkish War”, 1682–1701

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Terminsteuern</th>
<th>No. of T</th>
<th>Share of T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1682</td>
<td>21,867</td>
<td>1,548</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1683</td>
<td>22,937</td>
<td>2,436</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1684</td>
<td>17,585</td>
<td>4,630</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1685</td>
<td>16,061</td>
<td>8,220</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1686</td>
<td>18,585</td>
<td>4,836</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1687</td>
<td>17,784</td>
<td>4,851</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1688</td>
<td>18,528</td>
<td>4,627</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1689</td>
<td>17,782</td>
<td>4,603</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1690</td>
<td>17,872</td>
<td>4,558</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1691</td>
<td>18,144</td>
<td>4,387</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1692</td>
<td>18,744</td>
<td>12,244</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1693</td>
<td>18,060</td>
<td>12,862</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1694</td>
<td>18,279</td>
<td>24,149</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1695</td>
<td>18,460</td>
<td>27,371</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1696</td>
<td>18,610</td>
<td>22,966</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1697</td>
<td>18,904</td>
<td>25,927</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1698 18,818 18,437 9 50
1699 27,300 25,902 11 49
1700 25,110 5,647 5 18
1701 29,306 8,847 5 23

(a) Totals of the yearly contributions.
(b) Totals of the yearly Terminsteuern.
(c) No. of Terminsteuern per year; note that this must not correspond with the no. of appropriations in the resolutions of the Bohemian diet as each individual Terminsteuer consisted, in practice, of three parts, paid for by (i) the subjects; (ii) the market towns; and (iii) the price; in the Eggenberg domains, their relation was c. 37:3:60.
(d) Share of the Terminsteuern relative to the entire annual tax field.

The eventual outcome of these developments was a marked upsurge in tax revenues, which was achieved without any significant structural changes in the administrative ways and means these sums were collected. Over the course of the period considered here Bohemia’s fiscal-financial regime witnessed two major revisions, the introduction of the new tax cadastre in the aftermath of the Thirty Years’ War as well as the so-called (first) Theresian cadastre, put together in the first half of the eighteenth century. On a related level, we note that the drastic increase in tax receipts in Bohemia corresponds roughly with the increase in both (mainly) military spending of the Habsburg monarchy as well as the growing numbers of soldiers serving the emperor.34 These developments, however, were contingent on increasing collaboration between crown, territorial estates (Landstände), and, to a much lesser degree, the church in the aftermath of the Thirty Years’ War. From the late seventeenth century onwards, the interests of the monarch and the socially privileged orders of society aligned, albeit selectively, to a degree unknown in earlier times. The Habsburgs were able to rapidly ramp up their spending on the army and warfare in general thanks to improved control by the Viennese court and, in working with and through the territorial estates in their core lands, the widening of the fiscal-financial foundations on which the House of Austria rested. In other words: the Habsburg monarchy is poised to enter the ranks of Europe’s “fiscal-military states”, that is, 34 As compiled by Thomas Winkelbauer, Nervus rerum austriacarum. Zur Finanzgeschichte der Habsburgermonarchie um 1700, in: P. Maťa – T. Winkelbauer (edd.), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1620–1740, p. 179–215, here p. 182; see also T. Winkelbauer, Krieg und Herrschaftsverdichtung, p. 38 and p. 41, and the article in general for a restating of these trends and developments.
it had “a government which both taxed and borrowed in order fund warfare.”

Yet scholarship so far has almost exclusively focused on spending, and it did so from the perspective of the Viennese court and its emerging central bureaucracy. Only recently, as outlined above, did more sustained efforts begin to address the crucial role of the territorial estates


characterised by the increasingly symbiotic relationship between the monarch and some form of representation of the body politic(s) that constituted the social sources of power. This dichotomous approach is helpful in understanding the shifting dynamics between crown and estates, but at the same it raises more questions about the integrative characteristics and procedural particularities of how such states operated, as pointed out by Steve Hindle who maintained that “the state is not to be viewed exclusively as a set of institutions; rather, it is a network of power relationships which become institutionalized to a greater or lesser extent over time.”

This essay, then, is a first attempt to investigate “how certain forms of centralized and local power interact[ed] with one another”, thereby adding a new facet to the study of the “complex relations between the varied bodies that made up the fractured polity” of the Austrian monarchy around 1700, and it does so seeking answers to the following questions. If tax receipts in the Habsburgs’ nascent fiscal-military state went up thanks to improved “cooperation” among the ruling elites and their “consensus” to increase the subjects’ tax burden, one might as well ask how this was accomplished on the ground? On what kind of socio-economic and political foundations did this fiscal-military state rest, and was this achievement accompanied by comparable improvements in regional and local tax regimes? Or, more poignantly, was the nascent fiscal-military state accompanied by the emergence of a fiscal-military lordship to deal with the increasing tax pressures?


40 J. Brewer, Revisiting The Sinews of Power, p. 34.
Taxing Southern Bohemians:
The Eggenberg Domains of Krumau, 1650–1700

For years after its conclusion at Eisenburg (Vasvár), the short war of 1663/64 remained on the minds of the princely administrators, appearing for instance in a tax assigment that hails from well over a decade later that was issued to finally pay for "provisions dating from 1664" to the tune of more than 1,800 fl., payable to the "Royal Circle Administration in Bechin [Bechyně]". The memory of these dire circumstances, however, was not restricted to the princely officials working in Krumau Castle; to the contrary, it remained very much on everyone's minds – from the rolling hills of southern Bohemia to the imperial court – as a number of documents from the second half of the 1670s documents. Take, for instance, the fact that Eggenberg's chief administrator Aßberg sent an emissary to traverse the bailiwicks of Melm (Jelm), Salnau (Želnava), and Stein im Böhmerwalde (Polná na Šumavě), the demesne farm Weegerhof as well as to visit the market town of Oberplan (Horní Planá) to "stay in these places until all out-

41 SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Assignation, Krumau, 16 February 1675. The source is potentially misleading as the circle administrations were neither state institutions – as in that they were controlled by the crown – nor actually to be found in Bechin, but in the manors of the regional governors; there were two regional governors (one lord and one knight) elected by the diet, and their own officials carried out the administrative tasks of the circle. Not before 1751 did the circle administrations become state institutions; cf. Bohuslav Rieger, Kreisverfassung in Böhmen, in: Ernst Mischler – Josef Ulbrich (edd.), Österreichisches Staatswörterbuch. Handbuch des gesamten österreichischen öffentlichen Rechtes, III (K–Q), Wien 1907, p. 250–271, here p. 259–60.

42 Quotes respectively from SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Execution concerning the bailiwick [Gericht] Salnau, Krumau, 31 May 1675; s.p., Execution concerning the Weegerhof, the market town of Oberplan as well as the bailiwicks Melm, Salnau, and Stein, Krumau, 10 June 1675 (emphases in the original).
burden, the city’s arrears soon outgrew the magistrate’s capabilities to pay taxes and service its debts. This led Eggenberg to ask the Royal Tax Office to keep the city’s debts exempt from his other possessions to avoid being held personally liable. In several documents going back and forth between the prince, his administrators in Krumau, and his solicitor in Prague, this issue was discussed repeatedly during the last quarter of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, eventually resulting in considerably increased paperwork, which is also indicative of the complications of any clear-cut assumption of administrative streamlining via fiscal integration. In autumn 1701, the city’s debts for which Eggenberg could be held liable exceeded 78,000 fl., most of which originated from the preceding five years only.\(^43\) – To put this number into perspective: average annual tax returns from the duchy of Krumau between 1682 and 1701 amounted to about 31,400 fl. (median: c. 28,000 fl.), or between thirty-six and forty percent of the outstanding debts.\(^44\)

Eggenberg’s chief administrator, Johann Prix, in a letter, suggested that his lord should cover these debts at least partially, “otherwise it stands to reason that the clergy [the administrators of Goldenkron and Hohenfurth] may bring forth charges of disorderly conduct by our tax office…which may arouse suspicions at court and by other interested parties.”\(^45\) While Eggenberg heeded the advice, this did not make the problem go away, as much as he might have wished so. Less than three years later, in summer of 1704, and due to the continuous fiscal pressures of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), the city of Krumau was insolvent. The debt had piled up due “to many outstanding contributions, extraordinary [taxes], and other positions levied by the diet in recent years” and the resulting “wide-spread, country-wide poverty”, in combination with the continued exigencies of war, had rendered the city’s position untenable. Yet, even if Eggenberg assumed some of the city’s liabilities, the facts remained crystal-clear: “As far as we are concerned, it is the city of Krumau alone that is indebted and unable to pay its share [of the taxes demanded of it].” In closing his letter, the duchy’s new chief administrator, Sebastian von Liebenhaus, asked the Royal Tax Office to acknowledge, again in writing, both the lord’s authority over the city as well as Eggenberg’s limited liability in this instance.\(^46\)

Eventually, this particular situation – the insolvency – came to the fore anew in the context of a large loan the diet borrowed

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\(^{43}\) The total debt from the period November 1696 to October 1700 amounted to 78.124 fl. 34 kr. 5 1/4 d.; SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – Čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 64, s.p., Debt Specification, Krumau, 2 November 1701.

\(^{44}\) S. Sander-Faes, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 165–238, especially Fig. 3.1 on p. 203.

\(^{45}\) SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – Čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 64, s.p., Johann Prix to Eggenberg, Krumau, 30 November 1701.

\(^{46}\) SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – Čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 64, s.p., Sebastian von Liebenhaus to the Royal Tax Office, Krumau, 14 July 1704.
from a group of Jewish creditors from Frankfurt am Main and Würzburg in 1706/1707, which caused the city of Krumau comparable problems of solvency and was finally resolved in 1709 by amending the wording used in the Royal Tax Office’s receipts, which thenceforth were produced “with the clause Salvo Iure incorporationis, that is, [the city is fiscally] separated from [Eggenberg’s] domains.”47

Whereas the city of Krumau tried to get Eggenberg to cover at least a part of its arrears, the two above-mentioned ecclesiastical institutions, the Cistercian abbeys of Goldenkron and Hohenfurth, sought to undo their fiscal integration during the same time period. It all started in late December 1680 when Matteo Mattei, the collector of southern Bohemia’s royal beverage tax, in a receipt, confirmed that the three breweries that existed within the dominions of the abbot of Hohenfurth – one near the abbey and the other two in Komarschitz (Komařice) and Habern (Habří) – had not paid their beverage taxes via the ducal tax office in Krumau Castle, but instead transmitted the money directly to the responsible authority in Prague. Over the past three years, from 1 September 1677 to 31 August 1681, the abbey of Hohenfurth, despite having paid more than it should have, was violating Eggenberg’s princely prerogatives.48 That this incident became an issue in Krumau and Prague, however, was due to a procedural technicality: in response, Hohenfurth’s abbot, Johann Claveo, pointed to the relevant sections of the resolution of the Bohemian diet stating that he had paid more in taxes than he should have. Addressed to the emperor, all of his imperial and royal councillors, the Statthalterei, and all other responsible instances and individuals, Claveo first acknowledged that the taxes levied on the abbey were within the range set out by the diet resolution, which held that Hohenfurth’s annual beverage taxes should fall between 415 and 450 fl., but taking offence at being taxed at the top rate, then continued as follows: “If your excellencies would come to the conclusion that this constitutes a fiscal wrong, and that therein I was taxed at too high a rate of 30 fl. or more, then I would humbly ask you Excellencies and Lordships to indulge me and my congregation…to duly remedy the above-mentioned error, and treat me befitting my own rank as envisaged in the resolutions of the Bohemian Diet.”49


48 The annual taxes amounted to 450 fl., 415 fl., and 421 fl., respectively, for each of these beverage tax years commencing on 1 September and ending on 31 August respectively; SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L a, fasc. 62, s.p., Beverage Tax Receipt, Krumau, 26 December 1680; additional background on Hohenfurth’s breweries in Dominik Kaindl, Geschichte des Zisterzienserstiftes Hohenfurth [sic] in Böhmen, Hohenfurth 1930, p. 78–79.

49 Claveo’s supplication most likely went directly to Prague as well; a copy is found among those documents the Statthalterei sent back to Krumau, which explains the slight dating discrepancies;
In doing so Claveo implicitly related his supplication to the diet resolution of 1663/64, which instituted the beverage tax in Bohemia after repeated requests by the Hofkammer. Appropriated for three years at first, this fiscal position eventually became a quasi-permanent, but fluctuating, part of the kingdom’s tax system in the following decades while remaining, theoretically speaking, subject to consecutive renewal by the diet. And herein lies the crucial detail: because of its impermanent character, the original diet resolution contained a clause that set a certain range of taxation, which was carried over into the subsequently renewed resolutions. It was based on an imperial declaration that allowed “those members of the diet who so desire it…to be taxed at the minimal rate”, as the most recent resolution, adopted in 1678, held. It is in this seemingly innocuous detail that we are able to identify the root cause of the veritable avalanche of correspondence that engulfed Krumau, Hohenfurth, Goldenkron, Prague, and Vienna.

Despite outward appearances, Claveo managed to kill two birds with one stone: on the one hand, the diet resolution explicitly mentioned that there was a certain amount of leeway with respect to lower beverage tax rates. Yet in his implicit referral to the rest of the diet resolution – in particular to the proviso “those members of the diet who so desire it” – abbot Claveo also laid claim to sovereign standing as a full member of the kingdom’s diet. Upon close inspection, and once additional documents pertaining to the then-ongoing revisions of the tax cadastre are considered, Claveo’s intentions are revealed: both abbeys were sending their taxes directly to Prague because the provosts sought to take advantage of these revisions. In other words: they aspired to the full separation from the Eggenberg dominions – and this was perfectly clear to both the Prague-based Statthalterei as well as to the duke of Krumau. While the former, only five (!) days later, responded to Claveo’s supplication stating: “that this piece of information,

50 Beverage taxes rose from c. 150,000 fl. (1657) to 380,000 fl. (1664), declined somewhat to less than 300,000 fl. (1700), before rising considerably during the following decades climbing from 500,000 fl. (1707) to 636,000 fl. (1724) and eventually reaching 700,000 fl. (1739); J. Pekař, České katastry, p. 81–83, data on p. 82.

51 Resolution of the Bohemian Diet, 1677–1678, printed in Prague, 16 June 1678, fol. xiii (emphases in the original); note that the squared parentheses reproduce the original wording in the Czech and German editions.

52 Claveo set out to do so in (probably) 1679, as a copy of his legal arguments, transmitted to the Royal Tax Office (which was not responsible for the beverage tax) attests; see SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Memorandum by the Royal Tax Office concerning the status of Hohenfurth abbey, Prague, 20 June 1679; fulfilment of this aspiration.
including the correction and the formal details therein contained, has to be dealt with in the name of his grace (under whose immediate power the supplicant belongs), and has thus been forwarded to his princely grace of Eggenberg."

Consequently, the Statthalterei then decreed that “everything should remain as per ancient tradition [altes Herkommen]” and informed Eggenberg that “should be elect to remind [us] of anything”, he would be very welcome “to inform the Royal Statthalterei before too long.” This decision was accompanied by copies of the documents Claveo had sent to Prague to support his case.54

When he learned of the abbot’s activities in late January 1681, Eggenberg and his administrators recognised this entire sordid affair for what it apparently was: a carefully arranged, but not too-subtly executed, challenge to princely authority by means of administrative practices. Therefore, the prince immediately – on the very same day he received the correspondence – wrote a long letter to the Statthalterei. Picking up on their latter’s invitation to comment on these matters, Eggenberg responded in no uncertain terms: “Firmly rooted in well-established information, I herewith, and out of necessity have to, remind you that the ambition on part of the abbot and convent of Goldenkron stands in contradiction to both ancient tradition [altes herkommen] as well as the imperial and royal resolution dated 20 February in the year 1643…decreeing that both abbeys Goldenkron and Hohenfurth are not allowed to handle their fiscal matters separately from the lordship of Krumau.”55

This decision was further cemented into place during the general visitation (1653) when the abbey of Goldenkron had tried to be registered separately from Eggenberg’s possession; this, in turn, as the prince recounted, had caused “a lot of confusion” during the compilation of the tax cadastre two years later, but it was hardly a singular event.56 Due to these long-standing ambitions by both abbeys, Eggenberg (and his administrators) understood the seemingly innocuous language used by Claveo only too well,
reiterating that “the abbots of Goldenkron and Hohenfurth are not immediate prelates in the sessions of the diet” and “that nothing of this kind shall be permitted in the future.”

Within a few days, Eggenberg’s Prague-based solicitor, Dr. Nicolai, noted that Goldenkron was found to have been incorporated into the Eggenberg possessions only in 1655, which gave some credence to the abbey’s claims. At the same time, however, he reassured Eggenberg, reporting that the Statthalterei had re-affirmed its previous decision that “there will ne no alteration introduced, everything shall remain as per ancient tradition [altes Herkommen], and that there will be no [further] discussion.” Yet despite knowledge of this ruling, the abbot of Hohenfurth had petitioned the Tax Office in Prague directly to have his beverage tax reduced, again bypassing the proper channels. While the former was a legitimate complaint, the procedure itself was not; in Nicolai’s words: “both convents are under the immediate domination of your princely grace, and because of this both are deemed to be unable to act in a sovereign manner [sahlige Zü kainem Standmäßigen actu ZueZülaßen seijen].” Both the chain of events and the abbots’ activities are important, as Eggenberg’s response a few days later reveals.

Nicolaï was instructed to affirm that in trying to pay their taxes improperly – and to do so “in a secretive manner [heimlicher waß]” – failure rested with the Statthalterei and the Royal Tax Office. In effect pointing fingers because the officials there should have known better, Nicolai was to implore the “Royal Tax Office to act accordingly and issue an appropriate reprimand” addressed to the abbot of Goldenkron, “which at the same time should also be sent to the abbot of Hohenfurth as he, too, intended to violate the rules concerning payment of the beverage tax.”

A few weeks later, the Statthalterei informed the emissaries of the abbot of Hohenfurth in person about its decision, yet, as Peter Putz, captain of Krumau Castle, and Eggenberg’s tax official Johann Prix reported about a year later, the convent’s insubordinate behaviour had not ceased. Despite the transmission of “written information”, Eggenberg’s irritated administrators wrote, “the abbey is not ashamed of making unsubstantiated claims, including defamatory statements, addressed to superior instances, whose [the unsubstantiated claims] merits, when discussed on an earlier occasion [Conferentz], had been found wanting in every single instance”. The letter was accompanied by more documents to reinforce Eggenberg’s position, which explicitly stated that “neither abbot nor convent…suffered any difficulties, pressure, and oppression, as

57 ibidem (emphasis in the original); Eggenberg and his administrators listed a total of nine items, all of which were supported by the respective documentation; the correspondence itself was copied at least five times and it is reproduced in detail in S. Sander-Faes, Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit, p. 331–332.

58 SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Dr. Nicolai to Eggenberg, Prague, 5 February 1681.

59 SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Eggenberg to Dr. Nicolai, Linz, 13 February 1681 (emphases in the original).
they call it, that could be substantiated”. To the contrary, if “anyone had been insulted”, it was the prince of Eggenberg, “though these [insults] are hardly significant at all”.60 Putz’ and Prix’ report to the Bechin circle officials was accompanied by a number of documents that sought to both prove Eggenberg’s point as well as to the crushing debt that “in these hard times” excessively burdened “the poor subjects” who were in dire need of support.61

By this time, however, the general situation had changed dramatically. In spring and summer 1683 the Ottoman host advanced seemingly irresistible towards the emperor’s city of residence, Vienna, which prompted Leopold I to flee the soon-to-be besieged city.62 At the same time, it appears that the abbots’ activities had formed a precedent of sorts: first, in March 1683, Eggenberg ordered Ladislas Krinner, inspector of economic affairs and ducal councillor, to enquire whether or not

the contributions of the city of Krumau “were paid apart and separately from the lordship to the Royal Tax Office.”63 This letter underscores that the activities by the two abbots discussed above were both about minuitia of paying taxes as well as related to their status within the Bohemian body politic and the fiscal integrity of the Eggenberg domains. As the Ottomans advanced closer to Vienna, this interrelationship becomes even more apparent, as a second letter from Eggenberg indicates: to counter the threat, extraordinary wealth taxes were levied on Bohemia. Technically, these “Turkish and wealth taxes” were ordered by Leopold I in Laxenburg Castle on 3 May 1683, and subsequently imposed by the Statthalters, bypassing the diet’s rights to appropriate taxes. Yet the abbots of Hohenfurth and Goldenkron, “citing ancient tradition [altes herkommen], refused to contribute [their share] to the lordship, and referred to their [rank as] royal

60 This paternalistic magnanimity, though, was very much calculated, as the letter follows-up on this statement with the request not to punish the lordship – and its subjects – by ordering troops to march through the Eggenberg possessions and/or quartering troops there; ŠOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Peter Putz and Johann Prix to the Bechin Circle Officials, Krumau, 17 March 1682 (emphases in the original);

61 Putz and Prix again mention that “only yesterday [16 March 1682] they swore [assenta] that from time immemorial, and all the time, the contributions from this [Hohenfurth] and Goldenkron abbeys were paid to Krumau Castle”; ibidem (emphasis in the original); for the documentation see ŠOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Hohenfurth’s Debts, Krumau, 16 March 1682; ibidem, s.p., Further Particulars on Hohenfurth’s Debts, Krumau, 15 January 1677; extensive transliterations of the original sources available in S. Sander-Faes, Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit, p. 334–335.


63 SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Eggenberg to Ladislas Krinner, Krumau, 18 March 1683 (emphasis in the original); on Krinner see S. Sander-Faes, Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit, p. 507.
Thus, forcing Eggenberg’s hand, the duke of Krumau declared that “in this extraordinary case, and irrespective of the above-mentioned prelates mentioning [their wrong] rank”, he was putting monarch and Christendom first. In closing, Eggenberg asked “His imperial and royal majesty, in good measure and once the difficulties with the clergy have been put aside, not to refrain from reflecting [on this].”

This declaration was accompanied by a letter written by two of Eggenberg’s officials that reveal not only the prevailing mood in and around Krumau Castle, but it also demonstrates the impossibilities that were asked of both administrators and the tax-paying subjects. In an order dated 7 May 1683, Bechin circle officials demanded that the extraordinary taxes for both April and May – an anticipation that totalled 3,304 fl. – must be consigned within ten days, yet Johann Prix and Lorentz Torkowitzer pointed to the “impossibility, [and] that this [resulted] in asking twice as much, but at once, from the already hard-pressed contributors,” which is why they asked for an extension of the deadline. Only two days later, circle officials responded that there would not be any grace period due to “the highest possible threat…[and] thus the entire sum for April and May is due on the 20th of this month [May]”, which in effect meant that the Eggenberg administrators were given only an additional three more days to “consign the money…failure to comply, and of this you may rest assured, will result in military confiscations without either delay or restraint.”

These instances suggest two intimately intertwined, but also contradictory, developments: on the one hand, war-induced pressures reduced the latitude enjoyed by regional and local officials as strategic considerations increasingly overrode non-essential issues and established practices. Those matters that pertained to the continued conduct of war – “money is the sinews of war”, with Cicero – were increasingly prioritised while all other matters, including ancient rights and concerns for the subjects’ well-being, receded. While it certainly was among the lords’ priorities to protect his or her subjects from foreign invasion, yet we must not underestimate the pressures of such rapidly and immediately increasing fiscal pressures. In practical terms, both the “Great Turkish War” (1683–1699) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) led to a drastic increase in both taxation and spending, which in and of itself can be considered a noticeable achievement of the Habsburg monarchy. Yet, at the same time,
an in-depth look at how exactly this was accomplished in the Habsburg monarchy’s richest “metropolitan province”, provides a complimentary account to the standard, Vienna-centric, histories of *Austria’s Wars of Emergence*, on the other hand. In addition, these episodes also serve as a reminder that this power-political change rested to a large degree on the backs of the hard-pressed and over-taxed subjects. Acknowledgement thereof, and reconstruction of the minutiae how this was done, goes beyond the majority of studies that focus, rather uni-dimensionally so, on the monarchs and the estates; while the ruling elites, in close collaboration with each other, were firmly in the driver’s seat, the carriage was pushed and pulled forward by those without any say in the direction taken.

The dispute between the two abbeys and the duke of Eggenberg, then, is best understood as a conflict whose characteristics suggest no obvious break with ancient traditions and traditional social and legal circumstances. To the contrary, they were typically improvised, resulted in considerable additional paperwork, and increased the administrative burden at a time when the exigencies of war were certainly calling for more streamlining. Sure, there were improvements “around 1700 and in the first decade of the eighteenth century”, as Thomas Winkelbauer recently wrote, listing a number of issues such as the establishment of the Vienna City Bank, decreased interest rates, and “a few other modernisations with regard to Austrian state finances, without which it most likely might have been impossible to achieve at least some of the war aims of the War of the Spanish Succession”.

All told, Winkelbauer holds the reign of Joseph I (r. 1705–1711) as “no less significant than…the better-known reforms after 1749”, calling them “a modernising leap [Modernierungsschub]”. Yet it is in statements such as these that we are able to acknowledge this, but the perspective remains firmly focused on ‘the state’, which is usually treated as an abstract, almost reified actor unto itself, which in and of itself is also highly questionable assumption; see, e.g., Charles Tilly, *Reflections on the History of European State-Making*, in: idem (ed.), *The Formation of the National State in Western Europe*, Princeton, N.J. 1975 (Studies in Political Development 8), p. 3–83, especially 48–50; Peter B. Evans – Dietrich Rueschemeyer – Theda Skocpol (edd.), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge–London 1985; Martin van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State*, Cambridge 1999, p. 126–355; more awareness of the composite, direct, and personal nature of ‘the state’ can be found in the essays in Wolfgang Reinhard (ed.), *Power Elites and State Building*, Oxford 1996 (= The Origins of the Modern State in Europe); and idem, *Geschichte der Staatsgewalt*, p. 305–479; see also notes 15, 22, and 38.

to observe the analytical and interpretative limitations of a one-point perspective, in particular as the initiatives undertaken by both Joseph I and his successor, Charles VI (1711–1740), “appear to have had little tangible effect, and grave budgetary weaknesses remained”. Neither did the Habsburg emperors resort to cameralist ideas nor to more entrepreneurial-minded proponents of reform, to say nothing “of institutional reform in Bohemia”, as R.J.W. Evans emphasises.

Seen in this light, developments in Bohemia around 1700 can hardly be associated with the former interpretation. This latter view is also supported by the eventual resolution of the conflict between Eggenberg and his two ecclesiastical adversaries. In the immediate aftermath of the discussions above, these conflicts at first recede in prominence, most likely due to the exigencies of the “Great Turkish War”, the increasing fiscal demands associated with it, and the procedures of the then-contemporaneous revisions of the tax cadastre around 1680. Promulgated and introduced in 1683, the fiscal incorporation of both abbeys into the Eggenberg possessions was upheld by a diet resolution and underwritten by newly issued administrative guidelines about the implementation of the revised cadastre. Yet, and despite previous efforts having come to naught however argued for, the abbots of both Hohenfurth and Goldenkron continued to seek their convents’ excorporation. Appealing to Bohemia’s Supreme Chancellor Franz Ulrich Kinsky in 1687, they even produced new evidence gleaned from the archives of the lords of Rožmberk in Wittingau, the previous owners of the duchy of Krumau. The abbot of...
Hohenfurth renewed his case based on a receipt from 1600, which itself rested on a privilege from three years earlier, and asked “for the [fiscal] separation of the convent from the lordship of Krumau.”

After careful and extended deliberations within the emperor’s inner circle, however, Kinsky finally responded in summer of 1693, handing down Leopold I’s decision: all of Claveo’s arguments were rejected while at the same time all ducal prerogatives and duties were re-affirmed, specifically mentioning that Eggenberg’s role as “protector [Schutz Collatur (sic)] and holder of jurisdiction”. With respect to the evidence from the Rožmberk archives, the imperial decree held that in no way did this privilege intend to “excorporate [Hohenfurth] with respect to payment of contributions, to the contrary, all financial levies as ordered by either king or country [the diet] are explicitly excluded and exempted, which is also supported by a wide variety of ducal documents, correspondence, and receipts; it has been clearly proven that since the year 1537 that the convent’s contributions were consigned to Krumau Castle, added to the lord’s taxes, and from thence [transferred] to the Royal Tax Office in Prague.”

Leopold I’s decision thus ended Claveo’s aim of excorporation and contained three points: first, the decree confirmed Eggenberg’s leading role “in the repartitioning of taxes, the quartering of troops, &ct.”, although in all fiscal matters pertaining to the convent, a representative of Hohenfurth was to be present. Second, while all original receipts issued by the Royal Tax Office were to remain in Krumau Castle, authenticated copies were to be forwarded to Hohenfurth, which further underscores the abbey’s status as incorporated entity. At the same time, third, the decree reaffirmed the convent’s licensing privilege with respect to its brewery in Höritz (Hořice na Šumavě), which also serves as a reminder that the abbot’s claims were initially derived from Bohemia’s beverage tax, to which this entire affair remained, however loosely, connected at all time.

This outcome thus added to, not reduced, the complexity of the Bohemian


75 SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 63, s.p., Imperial Decree with respect to Hohenfurth, Vienna, 11 August 1693 (emphases in the original); extensive transliterations of the original sources are available in S. Sander-Faes, Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit, p. 337–340; this privilege by Petr Vok of Rožmberk is not mentioned in the convent’s history by D. Kaindl, Geschichte des Zisterzienserstiftes, p. 53–56, p. 78–79; note also that the older literature suggests that this particular decree occurred two years earlier, as per M. Mutschlechner, Die Fürsten von Eggenberg, p. 112–113.

76 SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 63, s.p., Imperial Decree with Respect to Hohenfurth, Vienna, 11 August 1693.
fiscal system, and similar increases can also be observed in a number of other sources detailing, for instance, the rise in contribution arrears and the similarly increasing attempts to offset them against current and future tax demands, comparable discussions in Krumau Castle about current and future requisitions by troops, and the large amount of documents in which Eggenberg and his administrators discuss matters pertaining to individual subjects. Or, to mention just one other instance, albeit very briefly, in the misfortunes that befell the Poor Clares in the city of Krumau during in the first decade of the eighteenth century. In the context of Joseph I’s escalation of both the War of the Spanish Succession and the fight against the contemporaneous insurrection in Hungary led by Ferenc Rákóczi, which erupted in 1703, demand for revenues spiralled out of control. Five years later, the cracks in the Habsburg monarchy’s fiscal-financial regime had become too visible to ignore: increasing fiscal pressures since the outbreak of the “Great Turkish War” a generation earlier and the gradual exhaustion of the tax-paying subjects’ capabilities to keep up with the exigencies of war had become too big to ignore. In 1708 Krumlovian Poor Clares petitioned Eggenberg to “show mercy and forward…this petition to His Majesty, including your recommendation”. Never before in its 400-year history had the convent had to face a comparable existential threat, abbess Beatrix wrote to Eggenberg, but if taxation levels do not recede soon, “especially all those successive extraordinary levies, my convent’s ruin is all but assured”. Between 1705 and 1708 alone, the Poor Clares’ arrears amounted to more than 7,300 fl., yet the nuns’ annual revenues barely reached 600 fl. Faced with this existential threat, abbess Beatrix had no choice but to ask for the forgiveness of these arrears, but not of current or future tax demands. Yet neither

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77 On the first issue, see, e.g., SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 64, s.p., Assignation, Krumau, 30 December 1704; on the second topic, provisions of “accommodation (‘Dach und Fach’) and Service (light, wood, salt, and bed)”, cf. M. Hochedlinger, Austria’s Wars of Emergence, p. 131, and, e.g., SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Execution Letter, Krumau, 31 May 1675; fasc. 63, s.p., Execution Letter, Wesseli an der Lainsitz (Veselí nad Lužnicí), 31 October 1700; fast. 64, s.p., Rescript by Eggenberg in Case of an Execution, Krumau, 13 January 1706; on the third issue, the case of Gregor Daubsky is paradigmatic with respect to clear-cut assumptions of integration via fiscal centralisation: Daubsky appeared repeatedly in the correspondence between the mayor of Budweis (České Budějovice), Frantz Pruntaus, and Eggenberg’s tax official, Johann Prix; Daubsky had both payment difficulties as well as marriage problems – but there are two reasons as to why he appears in these records: first, because of his inability to pay the anticipated sums as taxes doubled from one month to the next, and second, because Daubsky was one of Eggenberg’s subjects, but the osobně assigned to his house was incorporated into the fiscal regime of the city of Budweis; cf. S. Sander-Faes, Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit, p. 341–349.

78 SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 65, s.p., Beatrix Windterischin to Eggenberg, Krumau, 26 August 1708 (emphases in the original); s.p. Petition by the Poor Clares, Krumau, 26 August 1708.

79 SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 65, s.p., Documents enclosed to the Petition, Krumau, 26 August 1708.
the imperial court in Vienna nor the Royal Bohemian Deputation in Prague provided any relief whatsoever.80 By spring 1709, the Poor Clares were reduced to appeal to their protector, Eggenberg, who in return asked both his solicitor and his chief administrator, Sebastian von Liebenhaus, to come up with any suggestions.81 Both officials, however, pointed to the only remaining option: the partial assumption of the Poor Clares’ debts by Eggenberg; yet, it is hardly surprising that Eggenberg did not commit to any such thing (at least in writing as no additional documents thereto exist in the extensive records that deal with the potential consequences of these suggestions).82

The Fiscal-Military State, War, and Consequence: a Fiscal-Military Lordship?

What, then, can we make of these examples? They might, certainly, serve as vignettes of the complexities and idiosyncrasies of early modern monarchies whose ambitious protagonists required more and more money to wage war, which in turn fed into the eventual establishment of increasingly intricate fiscal-financial arrangements: state expenditures and the army marched in lockstep, the military became better organised and administered, and tax receipts rose as well, in part due to the conquest of Hungary and Transylvania and changes in the allocation of fiscal resources. In addition, recent research revealed the importance of the territorial estates in the improvement of the Austrian monarchy’s fiscal-financial-military constitution.83

But there is another picture we can paint of these same developments, the one sketched in this essay. Like virtually everything else – from European monarchy in general to kingdoms and lands governed by the Habsburgs to individual lordships – Bohemia’s taxes were equally “composite” in nature and consisted of a variety of different categories.84 Between the 1650s and 1700, the diet’s appropriations increased by a factor of four

80 SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 65, s.p., Johann Georg von Matzberg to Eggenberg, Vienna, 5 September 1708; s.p., Johann Georg von Matzberg to Eggenberg, Vienna, 12 September 1708; for the official reply see s.p., Johann Wenceslaus Wratislaw von Mitrowitz to the Poor Clares, Vienna, 8 November 1708; the Poor Clares then appealed to the Bohemian instances, for which see s.p., Petition by the Poor Clares Addressed to the Royal Deputation, Krumau, 31 January 1709; and Egenberg’s letter of support, s.p., Eggenberg to the Royal Deputation, Vienna, 16 February 1709.

81 SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 65, s.p., Eggenberg to Sebastian von Liebenhaus, Vienna, 13 April 1709; s.p., Eggenberg to Johann Zenker, Krumau, 22 June 1709.


83 Summarised by T. Winkelbauer, Krieg und Herrschaftsverdichtung, p. 37–60; on the territorial estates’ role W. Godsey, The Sinews of Habsburg Power; see also notes 37 and 38.

84 Cf. J. Peškař, České katastry, p. 24–26, further details on p. 57–66; consider the characterisations of the Habsburg monarchy, which Evans determined to have been “a mildly centripetal agglutination...
to six over the course of a mere half-century, and they did so by both raising existing taxes as well as introducing a number of additional and extraordinary positions. Reconstruction of the Eggenberg possession's fiscal history suggests that military contributions alone were not responsible for this drastic rise in tax receipts; between 1682 and 1701, the number of individual tax positions rose from sixteen due dates per year (1682 through 1691, consisting of monthly contributions plus four additional positions) to twenty-two due dates over the course of the seventeenth century's last decade. During these trying decades, the princely tax office administered the twelve instalments of the monthly contributions – 240 tax positions over twenty years – as well as 144 of these so-called Terminsteuern, bringing the total to 384 tax positions. All of these were administered, paid for, and cleared individually.

Figure 3: Due-dates, Lords, and Villagers, 1682–1701

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>T &gt; Lord</th>
<th>T &gt; Market Towns</th>
<th>T &gt; Subjects</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of T</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>398,736</td>
<td>136,501</td>
<td>7,628</td>
<td>84,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(a) Number of due dates and money equivalents deriving from the monthly contributions, which rested exclusively on the subjects.
(b) Number of due dates and money equivalent of Terminsteuern (T) paid for by Eggenberg.
(c) Number of due dates and money equivalent of Terminsteuern paid for by the market towns within the Eggenberg domains.

...of bewilderingly heterogenous elements”, and which these days – much like Russian matryoshka dolls, but with a certain Brunnerian twist – is labelled a “composite state consisting of composite states”; quotes respectively from R. Evans, The Habsburg Monarchy, p. 447; Thomas Winkelbauer, 1526 – Die Entstehung der zusammengesetzten Monarchie der österreichischen Linie des Hauses Habsburg, in: M. Scheutz – A. Strohmeyer, Schlüsseljahre österreichischer Geschichte, p. 59–78, here p. 59.

85 Taxes rose from between 300,000 to 500,000 fl. in the 1650s to between 1.8m (1697/98) to 2.3m fl. (1700); cf. J. Pekař, České katastry, p. 57–69; P. Maťa, "Unerträgliche Praegravation", p. 162–172; J. Bérenger, Les Habsbourg et l’argent, p. 163–382, especially p. 261–273; see also note 31.

86 Numbers are the annual aggregates consisting of 12 instalments of the military contributions plus 4 Terminsteuern (1682–1691, with the exception of 1685, which saw 8 Terminsteuern); the median for this decade was 4 per year; there were 8 Terminsteuern in 1692 and 1693, 11 in 1694, 13 in 1695, 15 in 1696 and 1697, 9 in 1698, 11 in 1699, followed by 5 each in 1700 and 1701; the median for this decade was 10; S. Sander-Faes, Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit, p. 201–213.
(d) Number of due dates and money equivalent of Terminsteuern paid for by the subjects.

(e) Totals of due dates and money equivalents.

(f) Gives the total number of due dates, divided between Eggenberg (Lord), market towns (Markets), and Subjects.

(g) Gives the totals of the respective tax revenues.

(h) Gives the share of the respective tax category relative to the amount of total tax paid.

To put these numbers into context, we need to differentiate between monthly military taxes, or contributions, and all other tax positions, or Terminsteuern. While the former increased by about a third between 1682 and 1701, these numbers pale in comparison to the latter category: both their annual incidence as well as their monetary value increased by a factor of sixteen to seventeen: four tax positions in 1682 yielded c. 1,548 fl., whereas fifteen tax positions in 1697 yielded c. 25,927 fl. Yet these totals can be somewhat misleading, and this becomes self-evident once questions about the social distribution of these resulting tax payments is taken into consideration. It is true that Eggenberg’s share had amounted to a meagre two percent (1682) of the annual total, which increased to about forty-two percent in 1694; yet, it is equally telling that in 1699, the year that saw the highest amount of tax receipts, the lord’s share had again decreased to its two-decadal mean of about twenty percent. Here we note that the contributions, or military taxes, fell exclusively on the subjects, and in-depth analysis of these numbers tells a somewhat hidden, but nonetheless real, story of the exigencies of war. In 1682, for instance, contribution payments – that is, paid for by the subjects alone – amounted to c. 93 percent of the entire tax revenues stemming from the Eggenberg domains. The military tax’ share dropped to below fifty percent during only four years (1694–1697) during the final two decades of the seventeenth century (see also Figure 2). At the same time, and because the subjects were also paying a considerable part of the extraordinary taxes, the lord’s share of the total exceeded forty percent only once (1694), with Eggenberg’s two-decade average remaining at around a fifth.87

87 Cf. ibidem, p. 165–238. Two words of warning here: first, the data analysed here treats all taxes as money of account (meaning payment in specie and kind as well as bookkeeping entries) that were funnelled through the seignorial administration in Krumau Castle, which includes a number of „additional tax grants“ (Nebenverwilligungen); it does not, however, cover those amounts that were levied directly on individual property owners. On the former see S. Sander-Faes, Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit, p. 207–9, for details on the year 1697; note further that these „other“ tax positions do appear every now and then in the correspondence when, e.g., Eggenberg in the context of the „Great Turkish War“ argued that he and his wife were taxed an additional 7,200 fl. in wealth taxes to help fund the relieve effort of Vienna in 1683; SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, I 4 L α, 62, s.p., Memorandum by Eggenberg, Vienna, 15 May 1683; see the transcription S. Sander-Faes, Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit, p. 336–7, n. 110. On these additional taxes levied on the property owners assembled in the diet, see P. Mařa, „Unerträgliche Praegravation“, p. 167–8.
Figure 4: Social distribution of the tax burden, 1682–1701

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Terminsteuern</th>
<th>T &gt; Lord</th>
<th>Σ = C + Td</th>
<th>ω &gt; Lord</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1682</td>
<td>21,867</td>
<td>1,548</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>23,415</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1683</td>
<td>22,937</td>
<td>2,436</td>
<td>1,058</td>
<td>25,373</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1684</td>
<td>17,585</td>
<td>4,630</td>
<td>3,020</td>
<td>22,215</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1685</td>
<td>16,061</td>
<td>8,220</td>
<td>3,962</td>
<td>24,281</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1686</td>
<td>18,585</td>
<td>4,836</td>
<td>3,310</td>
<td>23,421</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1687</td>
<td>17,784</td>
<td>4,851</td>
<td>3,310</td>
<td>22,635</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1688</td>
<td>18,528</td>
<td>4,627</td>
<td>3,247</td>
<td>23,155</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>1689</td>
<td>17,782</td>
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<td>3,107</td>
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<td>1690</td>
<td>17,872</td>
<td>4,558</td>
<td>3,127</td>
<td>22,430</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1691</td>
<td>18,144</td>
<td>4,387</td>
<td>7,606</td>
<td>30,988</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1692</td>
<td>18,744</td>
<td>12,244</td>
<td>7,606</td>
<td>30,988</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1693</td>
<td>18,060</td>
<td>12,862</td>
<td>8,331</td>
<td>30,922</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>1694</td>
<td>18,279</td>
<td>24,149</td>
<td>18,324</td>
<td>42,428</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>1695</td>
<td>18,460</td>
<td>27,371</td>
<td>19,046</td>
<td>45,831</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>1696</td>
<td>18,610</td>
<td>22,966</td>
<td>14,620</td>
<td>41,576</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1697</td>
<td>18,904</td>
<td>25,927</td>
<td>12,393</td>
<td>44,831</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>1698</td>
<td>18,818</td>
<td>18,437</td>
<td>7,893</td>
<td>37,255</td>
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<td>1699</td>
<td>27,300</td>
<td>25,902</td>
<td>10,566</td>
<td>53,202</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>25,110</td>
<td>5,647</td>
<td>3,477</td>
<td>30,757</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>1701</td>
<td>29,306</td>
<td>8,847</td>
<td>6,501</td>
<td>38,153</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(a) Totals of the yearly contributions.
(b) Totals of the yearly Terminsteuern.
(c) Amount of the Terminsteuern totals paid by Eggenberg.
(d) Total amount of taxes, consisting of the sums of (a) and (b).
(e) Share (ω) in percent of the total amount of the tax yield paid for by Eggenberg.

These numbers convey information about the monetary side of the Habsburg monarchy’s fiscal regime in Bohemia, but the reconstruction of Eggenberg’s tax history is also revealing in another way: there were no meaningful changes in bureaucratic practices in any of the instances involved, neither in Prague (diet, Statthalterei; Royal Tax Office), the circle administrations, or in the individual lordships. It comes as no surprise, then, that the massive increase in individual tax grants by the diet, relayed by the other Prague-based institutions, and the continuation of time-honoured practices increased the complexity of the
fiscal administration, which in turn led to a growing backlog: each of these tax positions was administered and documented individually, and each of the respective quitclaims had to signed and sealed by each of the four Supreme Royal Tax Collectors (Oberste Steuer-Einnehmer, Neywyśssiý Bernicy, or Regni Bohemiae Sumemratus Quaestor). It is hardly surprising that the massive increase in individual tax positions led to a corresponding rise in delays between assigning a tax position, receiving payment, and issuing the quitclaim: around 1680, the number of days elapsed between the tax assignment and the issuance of its receipt averaged around fifty days; by the 1690s, it took already twice as long, and during the War of the Spanish Succession the cumulative effects of these developments resulted in delays in excess of three hundred (average) to four hundred (median) days.

Figure 5: Delays in Tax Payments, 1675–1709

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Sources</th>
<th>Elapsed Time in Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>median</td>
<td>average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1675–79</td>
<td>31 A</td>
<td>31 Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1680–84</td>
<td>20 A</td>
<td>26 Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1685–89</td>
<td>23 A</td>
<td>33 Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1690–94</td>
<td>17 A</td>
<td>33 Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1695–99</td>
<td>32 A</td>
<td>41 Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700–04</td>
<td>18 A</td>
<td>32 Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1705–09</td>
<td>27 A</td>
<td>29 Q</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(a) No. of sources in the tax records; A = assignation; Q = quitclaim, or receipt.
(b) Time elapsed (in days) between the assessment notice on the amount of tax due issued by the Eggenberg administrators and the issuing of the respective quitclaim.

The Royal Tax Office in Prague consisted of one member of each of the diet’s curia, that is of one cleric, lord, knight, and a representative of the royal towns, (s)elected by the diet; if need be, changes could be made in-between sessions of the diet. Both German and Czech titles derive from primary sources, for the Latin translation see Ferdinand Mikowec, Starožitnosti a památky země České, Praha 1870, vol. I, p. 117; on the office see Petr Mařa, Landstände und Landtage in den böhmischen und österreichischen Ländern, (1620–1740). Von der Niedergangsgeschichte zur Interaktionsanalyse, in: P. Mařa – T. Winkelbauer (edd.), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1620–1740, p. 345–400, here p. 394–395; P. Mařa, *Unerträgliche Praegravation*, p. 160–161, both instances incl. additional references.

S. Sander-Faes, Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit, p. 311–328, note Figs. 12 and 12.1 on p. 316 and p. 318, respectively; see also the synthetic analysis of tax and other data on p. 445–466, especially Figs. 16 and 17 on p. 453 and p. 455, respectively.
Conclusions: The Composite Nature of Domination

This essay’s foray into the interactions between centre and periphery, exemplarily undertaken from the vantage point of the latter, suggests the following conclusions. First, and with respect to state formation, historians and social scientists have long pointed to the integrative role of centralising fiscal-financial-military regimes in early modern monarchies, but most of these studies do so from the perspective of the centre. Studying identical events and developments from the point of view of the Eggenberg possessions in southern Bohemia during the second half of the seventeenth century also reveals both the “accomplishments of those exercising power, but [also] its effects and its limitations.”

While the establishment of a distinctively Habsburg variety of a fiscal-financial-military regime around the turn of the eighteenth century made possible the emergence of the Austrian monarchy as a great power, we should be wary of drawing conclusions based on such a one-point perspective. Recent research on both the imperial court and the role of the territorial estates revealed that there, as elsewhere, was a high degree of “cooperation” and “consensus” among the monarch’s privileged orders, which allowed for the establishment of a fiscal-financial-military regime comparable to Europe’s other powers, but this was done à l’autrichienne. That said, this does not mean that the territorial estates were offered much of a choice in these arrangements, and neither “cooperation” nor “consensus” between monarch and nobility should obscure the exploitation of the subjects by their landlords and the widespread poverty among the rural lower classes, as was noted by a number of travelling contemporaries such as the French cleric Casimir Freschot or German adventurer and writer Karl Ludwig von Pöllnitz.

This essay, a case study focused on the Bohemian possessions of the Eggenberg family, asked about the concrete manifestations of such a fiscal-financial-military regime outside the centre, and in doing so provides a first look at these developments from the vantage point of the periphery. As has been shown, the prince of Eggenberg was among the kingdom’s most important aristocrats, but that did not spare his subjects from the exigencies of seemingly perennial warfare around the turn of the eighteenth century. We note further that the drastic increase in tax revenues during these decades

90 J. Brewer, Revisiting The Sinews of Power, p. 34.
91 This argument has been most forcefully espoused by W. Godsey, The Sinews of Habsburg Power, especially p. 5–12, incl. additional references; see also notes 35, 36, and 37.
was accomplished in the absence of any structural changes in their appropriation, organisation, and administrative practices as well as absent any meaningful economic development.\(^{93}\) To the contrary, in-depth analysis of the tax records preserved in the Eggenberg archive suggests a combination of local, that is, at the level of individual lordships, regional, that is, within the kingdom of Bohemia, and supra-regional – the Habsburg monarchy at war – (dis-) connections. Drastically rising fiscal pressures found their expression in the rise of the subjects’ indebtedness, increasing administrative and postal delays while at the same time domination’s fragmentation was adding to, not reducing or streamlining, the institutional and social complexity on all levels, from the lordship via the circle administrations to the Prague-based institutions.\(^{94}\)

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\(^{94}\) This is further underlined by the corresponding increase of tax documents that mention key terms such as “debt”, “military”, “taxes”, “coercion”, etc. whose incidence rose in tandem with the above-mentioned developments; for their discursive analysis cf. S. Sander-Faes, Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit, p. 445–462, especially Figs. 15 and 17 on p. 449–450 and p. 455–556, respectively.
counterintuitive in an essay about state formation, we are reminded that “there does not exist...a rigid alternative between the validity and lack of validity of a given order”, as Weber maintained in Economy and Society: “On the contrary, there is a gradual transition between the two extremes; and also it is possible...for contradictory systems of order to exist at the same time. In that case each is ‘valid’ precisely to the extent that there is a probability that action will in fact be oriented to it.” There is, perhaps, no better example to illustrate these transitory characteristics of “Legitimate Order” than those archival documents that deal with fiscal arrangements in early modern European monarchies. We are further encouraged to follow Brewer’s lead who recently maintained that “state formation operates from the local and particular rather than from the top down, and the emphasis is not just on the accomplishments of those exercising power, but its effects and its limitations.”

Recognition of both aspects, then, suggests to embrace the composite nature of the late medieval and early modern manifestations of traditional patrimonial domination, or Herrschaft. The term “composite domination” is proposed to denote any combination of the following aspects, which are neither mutually exclusive nor must all of them be identifiable at any given time; “composite domination” encompasses, first, the sum of all domination-related territorial contexts in any “ruling organization”, or Herrschaftsverband. It refers, second, to the “social relationship” between the lord and his or her subjects, including, third and pars pro toto, all jurisdictional aspects of said relationships while remaining cognisant of the potential diversity of each individual constituent part of the ruling organisation. Conceived as such, composite domination is thus, fourth, a social, socio-functional, and economic system that tied together the lord and his or her subjects in a variety of mutual obligations and rights transcending the overwhelmingly socio-economic considerations of “demesne lordship”.

96 J. Brewer, Revisiting The Sinews of Power, p. 34.
97 See the similar conclusion by the late medievalist Klaus Schreiner: “Lordship in the late medieval and early modern period was...dominium compostum in nature, i.e., lordship consisted of various rights.” Klaus Schreiner, Grundherrschaft – ein neuezeitlicher Begriff für eine mittelalterliche Sache, in: Gerhard Dölcher – Cinzio Violante (edd.), Strukturen und Wandlungen der ländlichen Herrschaftsformen vom 10. zum 13. Jahrhundert. Deutschland und Italien im Vergleich, Berlin 2000 (= Schriften des Italienisch-Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Trient 14), p. 69–93, here p. 87 (emphasis in the original).
98 On demesne lordship see Jan Peters (ed.), Gutsberrschaft als soziales Modell. Vergleichende Betrachtungen zur Funktionsweise frühneuzeitlicher Agrargesellschaften, München 1995 (= Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft 2, 18); see also idem, Gutsberrschaftsgeschichte und kein Ende. Versuch einer Auskunft zu aktuellen Ergebnissen und Schwierigkeiten in der Forschung, in: Ernst Münch – Ralph Schattkowsky (ed.), Festschrift für Gerhard Heitz zum 75. Geburtstag, Rostock 2000 (= Studien zur ostelbischen Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1), p. 53–80; on the current state of research see Markus Cerman, Villagers...
In recognition of the particularities of the “administrative and regulative order”, we note, fifth, the communicative dynamics of the corresponding variety of “media of exchange” as well as, sixth, the natural environment of any territorial context as the primary locus of its inhabitants’ life conditions. Here we further note that this latter aspect might be more relevant to the subjects and the princely administrators due to the often absent land-owner, which suggests, seventh, that domination in its late medieval and early modern manifestation should thus be considered a hybrid of real, or actually existing, and fictitious components. Perhaps evoking Schrödinger’s Cat, this last characteristic also points to the necessity to incorporate into future analysis any number of appropriate spatio-temporal considerations – that is, time and space in all their multiple variations and combinations – to better account for the complexities of premodern life.

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Stephan Sander-Faes

**Composite Domination and State Formation, 1650–1700**
**Manorialism and the Fiscal-Financial-Military Constitution in Habsburg Bohemia**

(Abstract)

This essay examines the consequences of the wars of Leopold I. Whereas the diffusion of the “fiscal-military state” thesis transformed our understanding of central institutions over the past three decades, most studies focusing on early modern state development employ top-down perspectives. By contrast, I am interested in the interlinkages of war and taxation on the regional and local levels in one of the monarchy’s core lands, Bohemia, and how they relate to the ongoing processes of centralisation. Based on the premise that individual actions and structural developments entail differing consequences for central institutions and the geographically more remote areas, this essay argues that state integration in the centre was accompanied by decreasing of cohesion on and control over the lower administrative levels. The Eggenberg possessions around Krumau serve as the basis for an in-depth case study, out of which emerges that the establishment of the Habsburgs’ fiscal-financial-military regime led to added, not reduced institutional complexity due to the composite nature of traditional patrimonial domination, or *Herrschaft*.

KEY WORDS
Fiscal-military state; state formation; Habsburg monarchy; Bohemian lands; Seignorialism; composite domination