Composite Domination and State Formation, 1650–1700

Manorialism and the Fiscal-Financial-Military Constitution in Habsburg Bohemia

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Introduction

Early modern Europe was not a peaceful place, and much of its history is marred by seemingly incessant conflict.¹ For much of this history, warfare was indeed characterised by confessional and political motives. With the benefit of hindsight, scholarship identified a gradual, but non-linear, shift that occurred over the course of the seventeenth century and which informs many periodisation efforts across disciplinary boundaries, be they the English Civil War (1642–1651) and its consequences for the British isles, the Thirty Years' War and the Westphalian settlement (1618–1648), or the triumph of monarchical authority over rebellious factions in Bohemia (1618–1620) and

France, the so-called *Fronde* (1648–1653). In all these contexts we note similarities as well as discrepancies, but the bellicosity of Europe's monarchs and their trusted councillors did not wane. To the contrary, "the capricious ambition of kings and ministers" was matched by the establishment of increasingly intricate fiscal-financial arrangements that were put into place by them to pay for these wars.² Most of these adjustments, despite outward appearances and ex-post interpretations, came about in hap-hazard ways and conveyed intended as well as unintended consequences that shaped early modern state formation over time. Geopolitical competition fed into the establishment and growth over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth

¹ Topographical information follows Anglophone conventions with respect to Central Europe: for place-names, besides those generally familiar such as Vienna or Prague, I am using their historical (mostly German) toponyms, with the addition of their current (Czech) name on the first mention. The results that are not entirely consistent and at times frankly unsatisfactory, but at the same time this increases the chances to locate these places on contemporary maps. To increase readability, whenever possible I have used the English equivalents of personal names (e.g., Charles VI instead of Karl VI.) where known; all second names are reproduced as they appear in the sources. Similarly, I have translated all quotes and added the original wording only in those instances where the argument warrants it; in addition, I added the respective references where full transliterations of the original source text is freely available. All dates are New Style, as this – our current – calendrical norm was adopted in the Habsburg monarchy in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. Cf. Robert John Weston EVANS, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1550–1700. An Interpretation*, Oxford 1979, p. xiii–xv; Peter George Muir DICKSON, *Finance and Government under Maria Theresia, 1740–1780*, Oxford 1987, vol. 1, p. xix.

² Adam SMITH, *The Wealth of Nations*, New York, N.Y. 2003 [1776] (= Bantam Books), p. 621.

teenth centuries of standing and sitting armies – soldiers and bureaucrats – which in turn led to another sequence of gradual, equally non-linear, feedback loops that are considered the explanation for both these dynamics of administrative-militaristic thickening as well as the drastic reduction of the number of sovereign states in the period leading up to the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815). In its most enduring, and perhaps also its most famous, formulation, Charles Tilly held that “[w]ar made the state, and the state made war”, noting that it was this most destructive of human endeavours that “wove the European network of national states, and preparation of war created the internal structures of the

states within it”.³ On these general trends economists, historians, political scientists, and sociologists are all in agreement.⁴

Out of this consensus, reached across disciplinary boundaries by the end of the Cold War, emerged the interpretation that, all other things being equal, the most successful case of early modern state formation was the Anglo-British union. Building on decades of scholarship and carefully considering London’s competitors across the Channel, John Brewer’s *The Sinews of Power* constitutes a historiographical watershed. Endorsing P.G.M. Dickson’s findings on the role and importance of credit for the British war efforts during the eighteenth century, Brewer argued that the growth of

³ Quotes respectively from Charles TILLY, *Reflections on the History of European State-Making*, in: idem (ed.), *The Formation of the National State in Western Europe*, Princeton, N.J. 1975 (= *Studies in Political Development* 8), p. 3–83, quote on p. 42; IDEM, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, 990–1992*, Cambridge, Mass. 1992 (= *Studies in Social Discontinuity*), p. 76; see also the synthesis by Paul KENNEDY, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, New York, N.Y. 1988, p. 70–139.

⁴ Follow the evolution of this trend in Anthony GIDDENS, *The Nation-State and Violence*, Cambridge 1985 (= *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* 2), p. 112; Philip T. HOFFMAN – Jean-Laurent ROSENTHAL, *The Political Economy of Warfare and Taxation in Early Modern Europe*, in: John Drobak – John V. C. Nye (edd.), *The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics*, San Diego, Calif. 1997, p. 31–55, here p. 35; Richard BONNEY – W. M. ORMROD, *Introduction*, in: W. M. Ormrod – Margaret Bonney – Richard Bonney (edd.), *Crises, Revolution, and Self-Sustained Economic Growth. Essays in European Fiscal History, 1130–1830*, Stamford 1999, p. 1–21, here p. 2; Jan GLETE, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe. Spain, the Dutch Republic, and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500–1660*, London 2002 (= *Warfare and History*), p. 216; Hendrik SPRUYT, *War, Trade, and State Formation*, in: Carles Boix – Susan Stokes (edd.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Oxford 2007 (= *The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science*), p. 211–235, here p. 214–215; Timothy BESLEY – Torsten PERSSON, *The Origins of State Capacity. Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics*, in: *American Economic Review* 99, 2009, p. 1218–1244, here p. 1218; Nico VOIGTLÄNDER – Hans-Joachim VOTH, *Gifts of Mars. Warfare and Europe’s Early Rise to Riches*, in: *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 27, 2013, p. 165–186, here p. 171–176; for a critical review cf. Benno TESCHKE, *Revisiting the “War-Makes-States” Thesis. War, Taxation and Social Property Relations in Early Modern Europe*, in: Olaf Asbach – Peter Schröder (edd.), *War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth Century Europe*, Burlington 2010, p. 35–62, especially p. 36–42. For the current state of the debate see the essays in Lars Bo KASPERSEN – Jeppe STRANDSBJERG (edd.), *Does War Make States? Investigations of Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology*, Cambridge 2017.

public debt – and Britain’s continued credit-worthiness – was contingent on regular taxation, which underwrote government borrowing. It was this set of fiscal-financial arrangements that conferred upon Britain’s leading politicians the comparative advantage of more reliable and credible debt service: after the Glorious Revolution (1688), London’s interest payments were no longer exclusively dependent on the capricious whims of any *one* monarch. To the contrary, the British body politic, assembled in Parliament, underwrote these loans, which allowed them to emerge victoriously from the “Second Hundred Years’ War” against France over the course of the eighteenth century.⁵ With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the evolving British “fiscal-military state” was more resilient than its continental peer competitor, France, but it proved equally intrusive and heavy-handed when “judged by the criteria of the ability

to take pounds out of people’s pockets and to put soldiers in the field and sailors on the high seas.”⁶ In other words: Parliamentary Britain beat its more autocratic rival at their own game, and we will return to this point in due course.

Taking note of the rich historiography spawned by Brewer’s argument, this essay is an attempt to investigate, “how certain forms of centralized and local power interact[ed] with one another” to more even-handedly assess the emergence of the fiscal-military state. Contemporaries and present-day scholars alike were (are) aware of the implications and consequences of the establishment of standing and sitting armies, yet at the same time we are reminded that there is neither a “clear trajectory or unbending path” nor “a consistent salience” of such fiscal-military states.⁷ Acknowledging these facts, we note the “experimental” or

⁵ P. G. M. DICKSON, *The Financial Revolution in England. A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688–1756*, London 1967 (= Modern Revivals in History); John BREWER, *The Sinews of Power. War, Money, and the English State, 1688–1783*, London 1989; studies building on the latter incl. Henry ROSEVEARE, *The Financial Revolution, 1660–1760*, London 1991 (= Seminar Studies in History); Lawrence STONE (ed.), *An Imperial State at War. Britain from 1689 to 1815*, London 1994; Robert BONNEY (ed.), *The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1815*, Oxford 1999; W. ORMROD – M. BONNEY – R. BONNEY (edd.), *Crises, Revolution, and Self-Sustained Economic Growth*; Christopher STORRS, *War, Diplomacy and the Rise of Savoy, 1690–1720*, Cambridge 1999 (= Cambridge Studies in Italian History and Culture); see the essays in Aaron GRAHAM – Patrick WALSH (edd.), *The British Fiscal-Military States, c. 1660–1783*, London 2016, for historiographical guidance see their introduction on p. 1–25; the quote derives from Hamish M. SCOTT, *The Second “Hundred Years War”, 1689–1815*, *The Historical Journal* 35, 1992, p. 433–469. See also note 35.

⁶ J. BREWER, *The Sinews of Power*, p. xviii.

⁷ This was noted already in IBIDEM, p. xviii; the quotes above are from John BREWER, *Revisiting The Sinews of Power*, in: A. Graham – P. Walsh (edd.), *British Fiscal-Military States*, p. 27–34, here p. 34, where the author himself uses the proverbial “Cheshire cat” to make this point; cf. further Joanna Innes, *Not so strange? New Views of Eighteenth-Century England*, *History Workshop* 29, 1990, p. 179–183, especially p. 181; do not miss the recent reflections pertaining to the British state by Colin KIDD – Malcolm PETRIE, *Our National Hodge-Podge*, in: *London Review of Books* 39, 2017, p. 36–38, who, in the context of Brexit, likened it to a “hodge-podge”.

“procedural” dynamics of such fiscal-financial arrangements across early modern Europe, which certainly call into question any clear-cut, quick, and unambiguous interpretations of state formation.⁸ Given the current state of research – a very uneven historiography that, in general, approaches early modern state formation from the one-point perspective of the centre, in addition to the geographic scope tilting towards Europe’s most successful examples (especially Britain and France, and to a somewhat lesser degree the Dutch Republic, the Spanish monarchy, and Prussia) – this essay pursues two rather different aims: on the one hand, assessing state formation means to study “a network of power relationships which become institutionalized to a greater or lesser extent over time”, we find that these processes emanate “from the local and particular rather than from the top down”; at the same time, the following investigation into the “complex relations between the varied bodies that made up the fractured polity of the

eighteenth-century [state]” breaks new ground in studying these dynamics in the context of the Habsburg monarchy around 1700 on the other hand, thereby expanding these discussions to Central Europe.⁹

These themes are pursued by, first, integrating the Austrian monarchy into the current debates on early modern state formation, focusing on the understudied period between the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) and the accession of Charles VI (r. 1711–1740). These decades witnessed Austria’s emergence as a great power, cemented into place Vienna’s hegemony over Central Europe, and saw the establishment of the first pan-European balance of power that lasted until the First World War. Using the example of Bohemia, arguably the Habsburgs’ own “metropolitan province”, I will then, second, approach the subject matter with a number of examples drawn from the rich, but equally under-used archives of the Eggenberg domains centred around Krumau (Český Krumlov).¹⁰ Since the

⁸ Quotes by William D. GODSEY, *The Sinews of Habsburg Power. Lower Austria in a Fiscal-Military State, 1650–1820*, Oxford 2018, p. 16; the decentralised nature of the Habsburg monarchy as an asset, not an obstacle, was brought into consideration by Renate PIEPER, *Financing an Empire. The Austrian Composite Monarchy, 1650–1848*, in: Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla – Patrick K. O’Brien (edd.), *The Rise of Fiscal States. A Global History, 1500–1914*, Cambridge 2012, p. 164–232, especially p. 164–168; on a more general level, cf. Bartolomé YUN-CASALILLA, *Introduction*, in: ibidem, p. 1–35, here p. 23, where the author introduces the notion of an “optimum size for the efficiency of fiscal states”.

⁹ Quotes respectively from Steve HINDLE, *The State and Social Change in England, c. 1550–1640*, Basingstoke 2000 (= Early Modern History), p. 19; J. BREWER, *Revisiting The Sinews of Power*, p. 34.

¹⁰ Term and concept of the “metropolitan province” derives from the debates about the roles of Ireland and Scotland within the British fiscal-military states; it denotes, in Andrew Mackillop’s words, “a constitutionally, politically and socio-economically distinctive society within the [composite Habsburg monarchy] which integrated, but did not fully assimilate, with the [neighbouring Austrian] state and society which formed the foundation of the wider [Austrian] fiscal-military complex.” See Huw V. BOWEN, *Elites, Enterprise, and the Making of the British Overseas Empire, 1688–1775*,

late Middle Ages, these territories formed a relatively large – in all c. 390 square kilometres (about the size of St Vincent and the Grenadines and a good deal larger than Malta) – and comparatively contiguous territorial agglomeration, and its respective owners – the Rožmberk (13th century to around 1602), the Eggenberg (1623–1719), and Schwarzenberg (1723–1948/49) – were among the most powerful lords in the Bohemian lands.¹¹ The third and final part of this essay assesses the pertinent question of the consequences of fiscal-financial integration via extraordinary wartime measures, in particular addressing the entanglements between local, regional, and supra-regional instances as well as their social and political consequences. In other words: was the emergence of the Austrian variety of a powerful

fiscal-financial-military regime in the centre accompanied by similar developments in its periphery? The reconstruction of the events and developments is based on the extensive tax-related records preserved in the State Regional Archives in Český Krumlov.¹² In the final part, I am going to address the wider implications of the findings and propose a way forward to conceptualise the crucial, but usually under-estimated, role of domination, or *Herrschaft*, which potentially consisted of any number of property titles, in the processes that characterised early modern state formation.

Benchmarks: State Formation à l'autrichienne

With the benefit of hindsight, the publication of *The Sinews of Power* (1989)

Basingstoke 1996, p. 154–155; the definition follows Andrew MacKILLOP, *Subsidy State or Draw-back Province? Eighteenth-Century Scotland and the British Fiscal-Military Complex*, in: A. Graham – P. Walsh (edd.), *The British Fiscal-Military States*, p. 179–199, here p. 181 (my modifications).

¹¹ On the Eggenberg domains see Walther E. HEYDENDORFF, *Die Fürsten und Freiherren zu Eggenberg und ihre Vorfahren*, Graz 1965, p. 61–188; Gerhard B. MARAUSCHEK, *Die Fürsten zu Eggenberg unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihres Kunstmäzenatentums, 1568–1717*, Graz 1968 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis), p. 153–188; for a territorial overview see Pavel HIML, *Die "armen Leüte" und die Macht. Die Untertanen der südböhmischen Herrschaft Český Krumlov/Krumau im Spannungsfeld zwischen Gemeinde, Obrigkeit und Kirche, 1680–1781*, Stuttgart 2003 (= Quellen und Forschungen zur Agrargeschichte 48), p. 37–39; on the administrative side of things see Martin MUTSCHLECHNER, *Die Fürsten von Eggenberg als Herzöge von Krumau. Kontinuität und Wandel in Südböhmen im 17. Jahrhundert*, Wien 2007 (unpublished M.A. thesis), p. 31–32; the most recent treatment is by Anna KUBÍKOVÁ, *Eggenberkové. Z bankéřské lavice na knížecí stolec*, Praha 2016 (= Šlechtické rody Čech, Moravy a Slezska 14), on Johann Christian of Eggenberg (r. 1665–1710) see p. 107–138, on the Eggenberg domains in the Bohemian lands see p. 168–186.

¹² This study is based on the tax records of the Eggenberg domains, preserved in the Státní oblastní archiv [State Regional Archive] Třeboň, oddělení [Satellite Office] Český Krumlov (hence SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov), Vrchní úřad – česká generálie [Seigniorial directorate – Bohemian Documents] (hence Vú – čg), sign. I 4L a, fasc. 62, 63, 64, and 65; this extensive documentation is complemented with some additional materials such as the resolutions passed by the kingdom's diet; further commentary on the sources and the archival situation provided by Stephan SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit. Böhmen und die Habsburgermonarchie vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis Karl VI.*, Zürich 2017 (Habilitationsschrift), p. 61–65.

constitutes a historiographical watershed of the first order for British history. Across the Channel, however, the full scale of Brewer's arguments was at first obscured by the impact of Nicholas Henshall's *The Myth of Absolutism* (1992) that almost immediately enthralled, albeit rather selectively, most early modernists in western Europe.¹³ Engendering lively debates, around the turn of the millennium many French and German historians concluded that "absolutism" had outlived its usefulness as a heuristic device.¹⁴ With no clear replacement in sight, Continental histo-

rians embraced the Cultural Turn and instead proposed that the early modern state was, above all, characterised by "cooperation" within, and "consensus" among, the ruling elites, which explained the limits of monarchical authority.¹⁵

These discussions resulted in three interrelated, but also somewhat contradictory, conceptual and historiographical trends: first, whereas most French and German historians were quick to cast aside both concept and term of "absolutism", there is now a growing unease, and a number of scholars are open about re-introducing it.¹⁶

¹³ Nicholas HENSHALL, *The Myth of Absolutism. Change and Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy*, London 1992; IDEM, *Early Modern Absolutism, 1550–1700. Political Reality or Propaganda*, in: Ronald G. Asch and Heinz Duchhardt (edd.), *Der Absolutismus – ein Mythos? Strukturwandel monarchischer Herrschaft in West- und Mitteleuropa, ca. 1550–1700*, Köln 1996 (= Münstersche historische Forschungen 9), p. 25–53.

¹⁴ Reactions to Henshall's argument incl. Heinz DUCHHARDT, *Absolutismus – Abschied von einem Epochenbegriff*, Historische Zeitschrift 258, 1994, p. 113–122; see the (other) essays in Ronald ASCH – Heinz DUCHHARDT (edd.), *Der Absolutismus – ein Mythos?*; Peter BAUMGART, *Absolutismus ein Mythos? Aufgeklärter Absolutismus ein Widerspruch? Reflexionen zu einem kontroversen Thema gegenwärtiger Frühneuzeitforschung*, Zeitschrift für historische Forschung 27, 2000, p. 573–589; Heinz DUCHHARDT, *Die Absolutismusdebatte – eine Antipolemik*, Historische Zeitschrift 257, 2002, p. 323–331; do not miss the extensive guidance offered by Markus MEUMANN and Ralf PRÖVE, *Die Faszination des Staates und die historische Praxis. Zur Beschreibung von Herrschaftsbeziehungen jenseits teleologischer und dualistischer Begriffsbildungen*, in: idem (edd.), *Herrschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit. Umriss eines dynamisch-kommunikativen Prozesses*, Münster 2004 (= Herrschaft und soziale Systeme in der Frühen Neuzeit 2), p. 1–49; see also note 19.

¹⁵ Cf. Wolfgang REINHARD, *Geschichte der Staatsgewalt. Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von der Aufklärung bis zur Gegenwart*, München 2002, p. 50–51; Jean PICQ, *Une histoire de l'État en Europe. Pouvoir, justice et droit du Moyen Âge à nos jours*, Paris 2009 (= Les Manuels de Sciences Po), p. 231–246; recent developments are summarised by Joachim BAHLCKE, *Landesherrschaft, Territorien und Staat in der frühen Neuzeit*, München 2012 (= Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte 91), p. 59–116; and by Matthias SCHNETTGER – Heinz DUCHHARDT, *Barock und Aufklärung*, München 2015 (= Oldenbourg Grundriss der Geschichte 11), p. 169–173.

¹⁶ See the essays in Lothar SCHILLING (ed.), *Absolutismus, ein unersetzliches Forschungskonzept? Eine deutsch-französische Bilanz/L'absolutisme, un concept irremplaçable? Une mise au point franco-allemande*, München 2014 (= Pariser historische Studien 79); on Anglo-French historiography, less sceptical than their German colleagues, e.g., James B. COLLINS, *The State in Early Modern France*, Cambridge 2009 (= New Approaches to European History 42), p. xi–xxv; Arlette JOUANA, *Le pouvoir absolu. Naissance de l'imaginaire politique de la royauté*, Paris 2013 (= L'esprit de la cité Gallimard); see also note 19.

Within German-language historiography, second, these debates fed into a number of interpretations of state formation (or the lack thereof) that eventually touched upon the latent, and still open-ended, question of the Holy Roman Empire's statehood; in all, these gave rise to two to three more or less different approaches, all of which are dealing with communication

while differing to some degree in terms of the "systemic" nature of the interactions among the various protagonists.¹⁷ Here we note that these discussions were, third, mainly conducted within, and with respect to, the borders of present-day Germany, which means these debates did not initially not include the Habsburg monarchy. While this was criticised at the time, and

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¹⁷ On the Empire's statehood, see the essays in Matthias SCHNETTGER (ed.), *Imperium Romanum – Irregulare Corpus – Teutscher Reichs-Staat. Das Alte Reich im Verständnis der Zeitgenossen und der Historiographie*, Mainz 2002 (= Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für europäische Geschichte Mainz, Beiheft 57); these two to three approaches include, first, "negotiated domination" (Herrschaftsvermittlung) and "triangulation" (Triangulierung), as proposed by Stefan BRAKENSIEK, *Herrschaftsvermittlung im Alten Europa. Praktiken lokaler Justiz, Politik und Verwaltung im internationalen Vergleich*, in: idem – Heide Wunder (edd.), *Ergebene Diener ihrer Herren? Herrschaftsvermittlung im alten Europa*, Köln 2005, p. 1–21; see also Stefan BRAKENSIEK, *Akzeptanzorientierte Herrschaft. Überlegungen zur politischen Kultur der Frühen Neuzeit*, in: Helmut Neuhaus (ed.), *Die Frühe Neuzeit als Epoche*, München 2009, p. 395–406 (= Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft 49); and the essays in Stefan BRAKENSIEK – Corinna von BREDOW – Birgit NÄTHER (edd.), *Herrschaft und Verwaltung in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Berlin 2014 (= Historische Forschungen Duncker und Humblot 101). These developments prepared the ground for, second, Wim BLOCKMANS – André HOLENSTEIN – Jon MATHIEU (edd.), *Empowering Interactions. Political Cultures and the Emergence of the State in Europe, 1300–1900*, Farnham 2009; here we note that Stefan BRAKENSIEK, *Einleitung*, in: S. Brakensiek – C. von Bredow – B. Näther (edd.), *Herrschaft und Verwaltung*, p. 9–24, here p. 12, considers the approach fleshed out by André HOLENSTEIN, *Empowering Interactions. Looking at Statebuilding from Below*, in: W. Blockmans – A. Holenstein – J. Mathieu (edd.), *Empowering Interactions*, p. 1–31 a "different perspective of the same phenomenon". Clearly more distinct are, third, the approaches derived from Niklas Luhman's communication and systems theories, on which see, e.g., the essays in Gerd ALTHOFF (ed.), *Zeichen – Rituale – Werte. Internationales Kolloquium des Sonderforschungsbezirks 496 an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster*, Münster 2004 (= Symbolische Kommunikation und gesellschaftliche Wertesysteme 3); Rudolf SCHLÖGL – Bernhard GIESSEN – Jürgen OSTERHAMMEL (edd.), *Die Wirklichkeit der Symbole. Grundlagen der Kommunikation in historischen und gegenwärtigen Gesellschaften*, Konstanz 2004 (= Historische Kulturwissenschaft 1); Mark HENGERER, *Kaiserhof und Adel in der Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts. Eine Kommunikationsgeschichte der Macht in der Vormoderne*, Konstanz 2004 (= Historische Kulturwissenschaft 3); Rolf REICHARDT – Rüdiger SCHMIDT – Hans-Ulrich THAMER (edd.), *Symbolische Politik und politische Zeichensysteme im Zeitalter der französischen Revolutionen, 1789–1848*, Münster 2005 (= Symbolische Kommunikation und gesellschaftliche Wertesysteme 10); Marian FÜSSEL – Thomas WELLER (edd.), *Ordnung und Distinktion. Praktiken sozialer Repräsentation in der ständischen Gesellschaft*, Münster 2005 (= Symbolische Kommunikation und gesellschaftliche Wertesysteme 8); Mark HENGERER, *Wer regiert im Finanzstaat? Zur Entstehung landesfürstlicher Entscheidungen unter Mitwirkung der niederösterreichischen Kammer im 16. Jahrhundert*, in: Reinhard Butz – Jan Hirschbiegel (edd.), *Hof und Macht. Dresdener Gespräche II zur Theorie des Hofes*, Berlin 2007 (= Vita curialis 1), p. 87–140; see also the essays in Stefan HAAS – Mark HENGERER (edd.), *Im Schatten der Macht. Kommunikationskulturen in Politik und Verwaltung, 1600–1950*, Frankfurt am Main 2008.

rightly so, by Ronald Asch, Harm Klueting, and others, it took about a decade before this omission was remedied.¹⁸

As of this writing, the unintended consequences of these developments point yet into another direction. Recent trends and current interpretations of European cultural, political, and social evolution are indicative of an interesting terminological (re-) convergence, clearly visible through the addition of the qualifier “Baroque” to “absolutism” when speaking about early modern France, many German lands, and

the Habsburg monarchy.¹⁹ This might either open a backdoor through which “absolutism”, qualified or not, is going to re-enter the debate, as it already did in the Czech case; on the other hand, it might also lead scholarship to the development of a different and perhaps even more plausible alternative in the future, which will, hopefully, go beyond the traditional court-centric and/or estates-and-diet-focused, one-point perspectives that characterise most of these approaches.²⁰

¹⁸ On the issues of the Holy Roman Empire’s statehood see essays in M. SCHNETTGER (ed.), *Imperium Romanum*, in particular the essay by Ronald Asch (*Frage an Georg Schmidt*, in: ibidem, p. 295–296); the state of research on the early modern Holy Roman Empire is summarised in R. J. W. EVANS – Michael SCHAICH – Peter H. WILSON (edd.), *The Holy Roman Empire. 1495–1806*, Oxford 2011 (= Studies of the German Historical Institute London); and R. J. W. EVANS – Peter H. WILSON (edd.), *The Holy Roman Empire, 1495–1806. A European Perspective*, Leiden 2012 (= Brill’s Companion to European History 1); the Habsburg monarchy’s exclusion in the original “absolutism debate” brought forth Harm KLUETING, *Das Reich und Österreich, 1648–1740*, Münster 1999 (= Historia profana et ecclesiastica 1), but it is also mirrored in Ronald Asch’s question; the Austrian monarchy’s entry into this debate was accomplished by Petr MAŤA – Thomas WINKELBAUER (edd.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1620–1740. Leistungen und Grenzen des Absolutismusparadigmas*, Stuttgart 2006 (= Forschungen zur Geschichte und Kultur des östlichen Mitteleuropa 24), for bibliographical guidance see the editors’ introduction (*Einleitung. Das Absolutismuskonzept, die Neubewertung der frühneuzeitlichen Monarchie und der zusammengesetzte Staat der österreichischen Habsburger im 17. und frühen 18. Jahrhundert*, in: ibidem, p. 7–42).

¹⁹ Witness the comeback of “absolutism” in scholarship on France in, e.g., Guy ROWLANDS, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV. Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661–1701*, Cambridge 2002 (= Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History), p. 9–17; J. COLLINS, *Early Modern France*, p. xi–xxv, Darryl DEE, *Expansion and Crisis in Louis XIV’s France. Franche-Comté and Absolute Monarchy, 1674–1715*, Rochester, N.Y. 2009 (= Changing Perspectives on Early Modern Europe 13), p. 6–8; J. ARLETTE, *Le pouvoir absolu*, p. 50–70, p. 119–48; EADEM, *Le prince absolu. Apogée et déclin de l’imaginaire monarchique*, Paris 2014 (= L’esprit de la cité); as for German historical writing, notice the change in title in one of the profession’s main textbooks: whereas Heinz DUCHHARDT, *Das Zeitalter des Absolutismus*, München (= Oldenbourg Grundriss der Geschichte 11), kept its title through eds. 1–3 (appearing in 1989, 1992, and 1993, respectively), there was significant shift from eds. 4–5 onwards: ed. 4 appeared as IDEM, *Barock und Aufklärung*, München 2010, while ed. 5 was published by IDEM – Matthias SCHNETTGER, *Barock und Aufklärung*, München 2015; see also Martin WREDE, *Absolutismus*, in: Friedrich Jaeger (ed.), *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit*, Stuttgart 2014, accessible online via http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_a0017000 (6 December 2018).

²⁰ The basis for the Czech interpretation is R. EVANS, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 195–234; consequently, Czech historiography now uses the term “Baroque Absolutism”, first introduced by Josef

This essay, by contrast, approaches one of historiography's late-comers to these debates, the Habsburg monarchy, based on two distinctively different premises:²¹ first, individual actions and structural developments convey different – and differing – consequences for central institutions vis-à-vis those occurring contemporaneously in administratively and geographically remote areas, that is, in the periphery. It follows, second, that state integration, understood as an *human-made*, but elite-driven, dynamic emanating from the centre of power,

is accompanied by countervailing and at times opposing trends and pressures whose consequences may or may not increase with geographical distance.²² Warfare, above all, concentrates decision-making and influence in the hands of a limited number of individuals and institutions while non-essential considerations (temporarily) recede. Armed conflict thus gave rise to a *certain kind of* state formation, which was accompanied by various degrees of disintegration and loss of cohesion *outside* the corridors of power.²³ In short, this essay explores, how, as the

VÁLKA, *Dějiny Moravy. Morava reformace, renesance a baroka*, Brno 1995 (= Vlastivěda moravská. Nová řada 6), vol. 2, p. 115; see also IDEM, *Společnost a kultura baroka na Moravě*, in: Ivo Krsek – Zdeněk Kudělka – Miloš Stehlík – Josef Válka (edd.), *Umění baroka na Moravě a ve Slezsku*, Praha 1996, p. 14–41, here p. 17; on the ensuing debate cf. Tomáš KNOZ, *Absolutismus nebo "Absolutismus"?* *K historii jednoho pojmu*, *Časopis Matice moravské* 121, 2002, p. 451–483; and Eduard MAUR, *Staat und (lokale) Gutsheerrschaft in Böhmen, 1650–1750*, in: Markus Cerman – Robert Luft (edd.), *Untertanen, Herrschaft und Staat in Böhmen und im "Alten Reich". Sozialgeschichtliche Studien zur frühen Neuzeit*, München 2005 (= Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Carolinum 99), p. 31–50, here p. 31–32; the term has since been adopted by most Czech early modernists, as evidenced by Jiří MIKULEC, *Baroque Absolutism, 1620–1740*, in: Jaroslav Pánek – Oldřich Tůma (edd.), *A History of the Czech Lands*, Prague 2009, p. 231–259, incl. bibliography.

²¹ Introductory overviews by Charles W. INGRAO, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618–1815*, Cambridge 2005 (= New Approaches to European History 21), 53–149; R. J. W. EVANS, *The Habsburgs and Central Europe, 1683–1723*, in: idem (ed.), *Austria, Hungary, and the Habsburgs. Essays on Central Europe, c. 1683–1867*, Oxford 2006, p. 3–14; further see, if heavily focused on military and political history, Michael HOCHEDLINGER, *Austria's Wars of Emergence. War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1683–1797*, London 2003 (= Modern Wars in Perspective), p. 50–178, incl. bibliography; most recently Thomas WINKELBAUER, *Krieg und Herrschaftsverdichtung in der Habsburgermonarchie nach dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg*, in: Karin Sperl – Martin Scheutz – Arno Strohmeier (edd.), *Die Schlacht von Mogersdorf/St. Gotthard und der Friede von Eisenburg/Vasvár. Rahmenbedingungen, Akteure, Auswirkungen und Rezeption eines europäischen Ereignisses*, Eisenstadt 2016 (= Burgenländische Forschungen 108), p. 35–61.

²² Cf. Peter L. BERGER – Thomas LUCKMAN, *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, London 1966, especially p. 49–85, quotes on p. 69 and 79 (emphasis in the original), hold "that social order is a human product. Or, more precisely, an ongoing human production... *Society is a human product.*"

²³ As Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, 990–1992*, Cambridge, Mass. 1992 (= Studies in Social Discontinuity), p. 58, held (my emphasis): "Eventually, European states converged on that form: the national state." – We should question and, if necessary, object to such overly deterministic and self-limiting conceptions; the state, in particular its early modern varieties, was neither unitary nor 'abstract', but rather composite, direct, and personal.

Habsburg monarchy's protagonists tried to cope with war-induced stresses around the turn of the eighteenth century, their actions started to tear apart the administrative and social fabric that held society together.²⁴ Recognition of these consequences suggests that once one leaves the corridors of power, there are different stories to explore. Studying the same events and developments "on the ground" thus allows us to formulate tentative answers to the pertinent question "how certain forms of centralized and local power interact with one another", to which we now turn.²⁵

War and Consequence in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1650 to c. 1700

Over the course of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), Bohemia changed dras-

tically. The Estates' revolt, defeated at White Mountain in 1620, was followed by large-scale redistributions of property, and the longer the conflict dragged on, the higher the damages the country and its inhabitants had to endure. When the dust finally settled, the Bohemian Lands had lost about a third of their people and large areas, especially in the fertile central regions, were most severely affected.²⁶ While most extraordinary wartime measures were gradually abrogated over the course of the early 1650s, a return to the status quo ante appeared all but impossible. Consequently, crown and estates collaborated closely to reorganise the kingdom's tax administration, which after a multi-year effort yielded a new cadastre, the so-called *Berní rula*, or *Steuerrolle*. Promulgated in 1656 and

²⁴ Cf. comparable arguments by, e.g. I. A. A. THOMPSON, *War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560–1620*, London 1976; J. BREWER, *The Sinews of Power* 1989, p. 138; I. A. A. THOMPSON, "Money, Money, and Yet More Money!" *Finance, the Fiscal– State and the Military Revolution. Spain 1500–1650*, in: Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate. Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, Boulder 1995, p. 273–298; Thomas ERTMAN, *Birth of Leviathan. Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge 1999 (= War and Statebuilding in Early Modern Europe); David E. KAISER, *Politics and War. European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler*, Cambridge, Mass. 2000, p. 14–25; Victoria TIN-BOR HUI, *War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe*, New York 2005, p. 48–49.

²⁵ J. BREWER, *Revisiting The Sinews of Power*, p. 34.

²⁶ R. J. W. EVANS, *The Habsburg Monarchy and Bohemia, 1526–1848*, in: idem (ed.), *Austria, Hungary, and the Habsburgs*, p. 75–98, especially p. 85–91, incl. bibliographical guidance; on the Estates' revolt Joachim BAHLCKE, *1620 – Schlacht am Weißen Berg bei Prag. Ursachen, Verlauf und Folgen des Zusammenstoßes von ständischer Libertät und monarchischer Autorität*, in: Martin Scheutz – Arno Strohmeier (edd.), *Von Lier nach Brüssel. Schlüsseljahre österreichischer Geschichte, 1496–1995*, Innsbruck 2010 (= VGS Studentexte), p. 79–97, incl. bibliography; on the forced Counter-Reformation Harold LOUTHAN, *Converting Bohemia. Force and Persuasion in the Catholic Reformation*, Cambridge 2009 (= New Studies in European History); the redistributive consequences are discussed in detail by Tomáš KNOZ, *Pobělohorské konfiskace. Moravský průběh, středoevropské souvislosti, obecné aspekty*, Brno 2006 (= Knižnice Matice Moravské 19); population numbers by Karl RICHTER, *Die böhmischen Länder von 1471 bis 1740*, in: Karl Bosl (ed.), *Die böhmischen Länder von der Hochblüte der Ständeherrschaft bis zum Erwachen eines modernen Nationalbewusstseins*, Stuttgart 1974 (= Handbuch der Geschichte der böhmischen Länder 2), p. 97–412, at p. 321–322.

revised in the late 1670s and early 1680s, it contained the numbers *osedlý*, or *Ange-sessene*, per territorial unit; these fictitious 'units of account' were used to determine the more or less exact tax burden that fell onto each individual lordship and its various constituent territorial (sub-) units, that included, but were not limited to, other lordships, incorporated ecclesiastical or secular territories, cities, bailiwicks, villages, and even individual farms.²⁷ The fictitious nature of these 'units of account' is further underscored by the fact that before the large-scale rewriting of the cadastre, the so-called "first Theresian cadastre",

which was compiled over the course of the first half of the eighteenth century, the number of *osedlý* bore no relation whatsoever to agricultural output, demographic changes, and economic hardship because of bad weather conditions, natural disasters such as the Great Frost (1708–09), or war-induced fiscal pressures.²⁸

Akin to the 'constitutional' renewal, effectuated in 1627/28 in the wake of the Habsburg-Catholic victory at White Mountain, the ensuing decades were characterised by change on many levels:²⁹ during the second half of the seventeenth century, in particular from

²⁷ The standard treatment remains Josef PEKAŘ, *České katastry, 1654–1789. Se zvláštním zřetelem k dějinám hospodářským a ústavním*, Prague 1932, p. 4–56, see also p. 57–100 for a synthetic overview of Bohemian fiscal history; see also Petr MAŤA, "Unerträgliche Praegravation". *Steuererhebung und Militärfinanzierung im Königreich Böhmen vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis zum Regierungsantritt Maria Theresias*, in: Peter Rauscher (ed.), *Kriegsführung und Staatsfinanzen. Die Habsburgermonarchie und das Heilige Römische Reich vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis zum Ende des habsburgischen Kaisertums 1740*, Münster 2010 (= *Geschichte in der Epoche Karls V. 10*), p. 139–185, especially p. 157–183; Jean BÉRENGER, *Les Habsbourg et l'argent de la renaissance aux lumières*, Paris 2014 (= *Collection du Centre Roland Mousnier* 64), p. 249–302, which is a revised version of his earlier publication (*Finances et absolutisme autrichien dans la seconde moitié du 17^e siècle*, Paris 1975) on which I have relied as well; most recently Jan LHOŤÁK, *Organizace poddanské kontribuce v Čechách a její písemnosti v 18. a první polovině 19. století*, Archivní časopis 67, 2017, p. 177–207; the original of the tax cadastre is preserved in the National Archives and subject to ongoing, but non-continuous, edition efforts since 1949; for this essay's purposes, note especially the two vols. on the Bechyňe circle (*Bechiner Kreis*, or *Bechyňský kraj*) by Iva ČADKOVÁ – Magda ZAHRADNÍKOVÁ (edd.), *Kraj Bechyňský*, I–II, Praha 2013 (= *Berní rula* 4–5); see further the general register, incl. a glossary and bibliographic guidance, by Václav ČERVENÝ – Jarmila ČERVENÁ (edd.), *Berní rula. Generální rejstřík ke všem svazkům (vydaným i dosud nevydaným) berní ruly z roku 1654 doplněný (tam, kde se nedochovály) o soupis poddaných z roku 1651*, I–II, Prague 2003 (= *Berní rula, Generální rejstřík*).

²⁸ J. PEKAŘ, *České katastry*, p. 101–145; for the (first) Theresian Cadastre, see Aleš CHALUPA (ed.), *Tereziánský katastr český*, I–III, Praha 1964–1970; for further information see Jörg K. HOENSCH, *Geschichte Böhmens. Von der slavischen Landnahme bis zur Gegenwart*, München 2013 (= *Beck's historische Bibliothek*), p. 250–251; K. RICHTER, *Die böhmischen Länder*, especially p. 340–347; see the multi-vol. reconstruction of Bohemian climate history by Rudolf Brázdil et al. (edd.), *History of Weather and Climate in the Czech Lands/Historie počasí v českých zemích*, I–VIII, Zürich–Brno 1995–2011 (= *Zürcher geographische Schriften*), especially vol. V.

²⁹ On the 'constitutional' change, the so-called Renewed Land Ordinance(s) in Bohemia and Moravia, see the texts in Hermenegild JIREČEK (ed.), *Constitutiones Regni Bohemiae anno 1627 reformatae*, Praha 1888 (= *Codex juris Bohemici* 5, 2); on the legal implications see Lutz RENTZOW,

the 1670s onwards, Bohemian taxes became increasingly differentiated as both the monthly military tax, or *Contribution*, and many other military and non-military levies were specifically earmarked for purposes that ranged from extraordinary war taxation to more regular sums for the fortifications of Prague and Eger (Cheb) to the salaries of officials throughout the country to wedding presents, all payable on specified dates.³⁰ These characteristics remained essentially unaltered until the reforms under Maria Theresa, yet this briefest of sketches allows us to recognise the dynamics of the Habsburg monarchy's fiscal-financial regime during the period under consideration here. As time went on, the emperor engaged in more wars that, at the same time, became ever more

costly, which is mirrored by the appropriations of the Bohemian diet that grew from between 300,000 to 500,000 fl. in the 1650s to between 1.8 m (1697/98) to 2.3 m fl. (1700), in other words: an increase by a factor of four to six over the course of a mere half-century, depending on the available data.³¹

Data gleaned from the tax records of the Eggenberg domains in southern Bohemia, are equally fragmentary, which is particularly true for the third quarter of the seventeenth century, but there are much more reliable records for the "Great Turkish War" (1683–1699). As far as I was able to reconstruct their tax history, the main difference between these periods derives from the somewhat diverging receipts recorded in Krumau and what (little) we know for sure about

Die Entstehungs- und Wirkungsgeschichte der Verneuernten Landesordnung für das Königreich Böhmen von 1627, Frankfurt am Main 1998 (= Rechtshistorische Reihe 172); preparatory work is covered by Marta KADLECOVÁ, *Verneuerte Landesordnungen in Böhmen und Mähren (1627/1628). Das prozessuale Vorverfahren*, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Germanistische Abtheilung 120, 2003, p. 150–179; on these changes see Hans-Wolfgang BERGERHAUSEN, *Die "Verneuerte Landesordnung" in Böhmen 1627. Ein Grunddokument des habsburgischen Absolutismus*, Historische Zeitschrift 272, 2001, p. 327–351; Karel MALÝ, *Die Böhmisches Konföderationsakte und die Verneuerte Landesordnung. Zwei böhmische Verfassungsgestaltungen zu Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts*, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanistische Abtheilung 122, 2005, p. 285–300.

³⁰ On the differentiation in general cf. J. PEKAŘ, *České katastry*, p. 24–26, more details on p. 57–66, with wedding presents ("Donativ") on p. 66–69; an example is the wedding present granted by the diet on the occasion of Leopold I's first marriage to Margarita Teresa of Spain in 1666, on which see SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Repartitiones 1665, s.l. [Krumau], s.d. In the following, all redundant information is omitted.

³¹ Additional context on the entire monarchy's outlays by Thomas WINKELBAUER, *Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht. Länder und Untertanen des Hauses Habsburg im konfessionellen Zeitalter, 1522–1699*, Wien 2003 (= Österreichische Geschichte 8, 1–2), vol. I, p. 449–529; see also IDEM, *Krieg und Herrschaftsverdichtung*, p. 35–61; on Bohemia in much detail J. PEKAŘ, *České katastry*, p. 57–69; very condensed, but also less clearly represented, P. MAŤA, "Unerträgliche Praegravation", p. 162–72; see also J. BÉRENGER, *Les Habsbourg et l'argent*, p. 163–382, especially p. 261–273. Note that all these imprecise are imprecise, some more than others, but there is no single study that brings together Bohemia's tax history between 1652 and around 1700.

the overall tax grants by the kingdom's diet during the third quarter of the seventeenth century; from around 1680, the data suggest a closer correlation between these two points of reference; Figure 1, which covers the periods from 1657 to 1669 and from 1682 to 1701, provides the following details as compiled by Eggenberg's officials a few years after these periods: the total sums paid by the duchy of Krumau, which includes payments by Eggenberg, his subjects, and a number of places (the eponymous city,

a few market towns, and some bailiwicks that were themselves proprietors), broken down into the monthly military tax, or Contribution, all other taxes, and the number of individual tax grants per year. In addition, I have added the number of *osedlý*, or *Angesessene*, which was used by the Royal Tax Office (*königliches Obergeldamt*, or *královský úřad berničný*) in Prague and the circle administrators in Bechin (Bechyně) as well as the average amount of fl. per *osedlý* and year, all based on these data.³²

Figure 1: Eggenberg's Tax History, 1657–1669, 1682–1701

	Σ ^a	Contribution ^b	Terminsteuern ^c	Osedlý ^d	o osedlý/year ^e
1657	18,130	18,130	–	2,622 $\frac{3}{4}$	7
1658	35,538	17,788	17,750	2,538 $\frac{1}{4}$	14
1659	29,837	22,025	7,812	2,548 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$
1660	34,487	22,470	12,017	2,576 $\frac{1}{8}$	13 $\frac{1}{3}$
1661	42,041	32,080	9,961	2,594 $\frac{7}{8}$	16
1662	43,796	31,909	11,887	2,526 $\frac{1}{16}$	17
1663	44,724	32,442	12,282	2,548 $\frac{1}{2}$	18
1664	48,991	42,820	6,171	2,548 $\frac{1}{2}$	20
1665	47,070	21,014	26,056	2,595 $\frac{1}{8}$	18
1666	49,330	28,211	21,119	2,606 $\frac{3}{8}$	19
1667	22,959	22,959	–	2,606 $\frac{3}{8}$	9
1668	24,502	20,687	3,815	2,606 $\frac{1}{4}$	9
1669	14,518	14,518	–	2,595 $\frac{1}{4}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$
1682	23,415	21,867	1,548	2,630 $\frac{5}{8}$	9

³² Here we note that some of the data was taken from (unfortunately undated) ex-post compilations dating, perhaps, from between 1674 and 1684 as well as 1701 to 1706, respectively, which refer to sign. I 4L a, fasc. 62 and 64, respectively, where I found these documents; I have surveyed all existing tax records between 1675 and 1710 (sign. I 4L a, fasc. 62, 63, 64, 65) and tried, to the best of my abilities, to cross-check the data in the two ex-post compilations with the assignments and receipts; the above-mentioned reservations with respect to the data's reliability apply as well, and it is further complicated by two large-scale efforts on part of the Schwarzenberg archivists, undertaken between 1793 and 1803 as well as after the abolition of serfdom in 1848, who are responsible for the existent archival organisation; further information as per S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, 61–66.

1683^f	25,373	22,937	2,436	2,598 $1\frac{5}{16}$ 1,668 $\frac{5}{8}$	10 15
1684	22,215	17,585	4,630	1,593 $\frac{1}{2}$	14
1685	24,281	16,061	8,220	1,606 $\frac{5}{8}$	15
1686	23,421	18,585	4,836	1,606 $\frac{5}{8}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$
1687	22,635	17,784	4,851	1,553 $\frac{1}{16}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$
1688	23,155	18,528	4,627	1,588 $\frac{5}{16}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$
1689	22,385	17,782	4,603	1,511 $\frac{1}{4}$	15
1690	22,430	17,872	4,558	1,559 $\frac{5}{8}$	14
1691	22,531	18,144	4,387	1,571 $\frac{5}{16}$	14
1692	30,988	18,744	12,244	1,607 $\frac{7}{8}$	19
1693	30,922	18,060	12,862	1,607 $\frac{7}{8}$	20
1694	42,428	18,279	24,149	1,575	27
1695	45,831	18,460	27,371	1,581 $\frac{1}{4}$	29
1696	41,576	18,610	22,966	1,604 $\frac{7}{8}$	26
1697	44,831	18,904	25,927	1,612 $\frac{3}{16}$	28
1698	37,255	18,818	18,437	1,559 $\frac{1}{8}$	24
1699	53,202	27,300	25,902	1,582 $\frac{3}{8}$	34
1700	30,757	25,110	5,647	1,613 $\frac{1}{2}$	19
1701	38,153	29,306	8,847	1,607 $\frac{5}{8}$	24

Sources: SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L a, fasc. 62, 63, and 64, *Overview of Taxes Paid, 1682–1701, Krumau, s.d.*; adapted from S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 196–197, 200, 203, 225–226; all monetary values in fl. Note that there are some gaps in the archival sources, which is visible in the absence of any *Terminsteuern* in the years 1667 and 1669; I have not found sources in Krumau for the period from 1670 to 1681.

- (a) Annual totals consisting of monthly military taxes, or *Kontribution*, and all other tax positions, or *Terminsteuern*.
- (b) Totals of the yearly contributions.
- (c) Totals of the yearly *Terminsteuern*; note that this is a composite category in which, for analytical purposes all tax positions other than the contribution were aggregated; note further that this category consisted of a wide range, and over time changing number, of tax positions (here the data suggest more nuanced categorisation than that put forth by J. PEKAŘ, *České katastry*, p. 24–6, more details on p. 57–100; and, writing in Pekař's vein, also from P. MAŤA, "Unerträgliche Praegravation", p. 162–164) that I put together to assess the overall proportion between the contribution and the *Terminsteuern*.
- (d) Number of osedlý, or Angesessene, used by Bohemian and circle officials to allocate the tax burden; see also (f).
- (e) Average annual tax burden per osedlý, or Angesessene.

- (f) There are two sets of data in 1683 because of the revisions to the tax cadastre, which went into effect as of 1 October 1683, resulting in a reduction of the number of *osedlý*, or *Angesessene*, by about 40 percent throughout the Eggenberg domains and the corresponding increase in the average annualised tax burden per *osedlý*, or *Angesessene*.

As shown in Figure 1, there are two drastic spikes in tax receipts during the second half of the seventeenth century, and both are associated with warfare against the Ottoman empire in 1663/1664 and 1683–1699, respectively. Here we note that the former conflict, on the one hand, was both much shorter and it is less-extensively documented in the Eggenberg tax records, in turn rendering any clear-cut assumption, or interpretation, potentially problematic. The late-seventeenth century conflict, on the other

hand, is different on several accounts: the archival documentation is much more reliable, it is considerably more extensive, and the “Great Turkish War” was also much longer, which suggests a more carefully calibrated tax regime was necessary. The result was an increase in fiscal-financial *complexity*, that is, Bohemia’s tax appropriations became more numerous, their individual characteristics grew more distinctive, and their administrative-procedural mechanisms increased as well, as illustrated by Figure 2.³³

Figure 2: Eggenberg’s Taxes and the “Great Turkish War”, 1682–1701

	Contribution ^a	Terminsteuern ^b	No. of T ^c	Share of T ^d
1682	21,867	1,548	4	7
1683	22,937	2,436	4	10
1684	17,585	4,630	4	21
1685	16,061	8,220	8	34
1686	18,585	4,836	4	21
1687	17,784	4,851	4	21
1688	18,528	4,627	4	20
1689	17,782	4,603	4	21
1690	17,872	4,558	4	20
1691	18,144	4,387	4	19
1692	18,744	12,244	8	40
1693	18,060	12,862	8	42
1694	18,279	24,149	11	57
1695	18,460	27,371	13	60
1696	18,610	22,966	15	55
1697	18,904	25,927	15	58

³³ For the definition of social complexity, see Joseph A. TAINTER, *The Collapse of Complex Societies*, Cambridge 2009 (= New Studies in Archaeology), p. 22–38.

1698	18,818	18,437	9	50
1699	27,300	25,902	11	49
1700	25,110	5,647	5	18
1701	29,306	8,847	5	23

Sources: SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, *Vú – ěg, sign. I 4 L a, fasc. 62, 63, and 64, s.p., Overview of Taxes Paid, 1682–1701, Krumau, s.d.; cf. S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 203, p. 231–234; all monetary values in fl.*

- (a) Totals of the yearly contributions.
- (b) Totals of the yearly *Terminsteuern*.
- (c) No. of *Terminsteuern* per year; note that this must not correspond with the no. of appropriations in the resolutions of the Bohemian diet as each individual *Terminsteuer* consisted, in practice, of three parts, paid for by (i) the subjects; (ii) the market towns; and (iii) the price; in the Eggenberg domains, their relation was c. 37:3:60.
- (d) Share of the *Terminsteuern* relative to the entire annual tax field.

The eventual outcome of these developments was a marked upsurge in tax revenues, which was achieved without any significant structural changes in the administrative ways and means these sums were collected. Over the course of the period considered here Bohemia's fiscal-financial regime witnessed two major revisions, the introduction of the new tax cadastre in the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War as well as the so-called (first) Theresian cadastre, put together in the first half of the eighteenth century. On a related level, we note that the drastic increase in tax receipts in Bohemia corresponds roughly with the increase in both (mainly) military spending of the Habsburg monarchy as well as the growing numbers of soldiers serving the emperor.³⁴ These developments,

however, were contingent on increasing collaboration between crown, territorial estates (*Landstände*), and, to a much lesser degree, the church in the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War. From the late seventeenth century onwards, the interests of the monarch and the socially privileged orders of society aligned, albeit selectively, to a degree unknown in earlier times. The Habsburgs were able to rapidly ramp up their spending on the army and warfare in general thanks to improved control by the Viennese court and, in working with and through the territorial estates in their core lands, the widening of the fiscal-financial foundations on which the House of Austria rested. In other words: the Habsburg monarchy is poised to enter the ranks of Europe's "fiscal-military states", that is,

³⁴ As compiled by Thomas WINKELBAUER, *Nervus rerum austriacarum. Zur Finanzgeschichte der Habsburgermonarchie um 1700*, in: P. Maťa – T. Winkelbauer (edd.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1620–1740*, p. 179–215, here p. 182; see also T. WINKELBAUER, *Krieg und Herrschaftsverdichtung*, p. 38 and p. 41, and the article in general for a restating of these trends and developments.

it had “a government which both taxed and borrowed in order fund warfare.”³⁵

Yet scholarship so far has almost exclusively focused on *spending*, and it did so from the perspective of the Viennese court and its emerging central bureaucracy.³⁶ Only recently, as outlined above, did more sustained efforts begin to address the crucial role of the territorial estates

with respect to the Austrian monarchy’s fiscal-financial regime. Their continued existence, current interpretations hold, was less due to the estates constituting an obstacle to state-building, but rather “because they offered the regime a politically viable way of governing as ever-increasing quantities of money and other resources had to be taken from local people.”³⁷ This period was

³⁵ The conceptual framework goes back to J. BREWER, *The Sinews of Power*, for subsequent developments with respect to Anglo-British scholarship, see the invaluable collection by Christopher STORRS (ed.), *The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe. Essays in Honour of P. G. M. Dickson*, Farnham 2009, especially the essays by Christopher STORRS, *Introduction. The Fiscal-Military State in the “Long” Eighteenth Century*, p. 1–22, and Hamish M. SCOTT, *The Fiscal-Military State and International Rivalry*, p. 23–53; further see the equally impressive collection by A. GRAHAM – P. WALSH (edd.), *The British Fiscal-Military States*, especially the editors’ research overview (*Introduction*, p. 1–25), Brewer’s comment on his scholarship’s impact (*Revisiting The Sinews of Power*, p. 27–34), and Stephen Conway’s concluding remarks (*Afterword*, p. 263–269); on the Habsburg monarchy start with the annotated overview by P. MAŤA – T. WINKELBAUER, *Einleitung*, in: ibidem (edd.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1620–1740*, p. 7–42; now see Michael HOCHEDLINGER, *The Habsburg Monarchy. From “Military-Fiscal State” to “Militarization”*, in: C. Storrs (ed.), *The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe*, p. 54–94; R. PIEPER, *Financing an Empire*, albeit on the Habsburgs’ “fiscal state”; T. WINKELBAUER, *Krieg und Herrschaftsverdichtung*; most recently W. GODSEY, *The Sinews of Habsburg Power*, from whence the definition (by Hamish Scott) was taken from p. 15.

³⁶ See, e.g., the studies by Adolf BEER, *Die Finanzen Oesterreichs im XIX. Jahrhundert*, Prague 1877; IDEM, *Die Staatsschulden und die Ordnung des Staatshaushaltes unter Maria Theresia*, Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte 82, 1895, p. 1–135; IDEM, *Die Finanzverwaltung Oesterreichs, 1749–1816*, Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung 15, 1894, p. 237–366; see also T. WINKELBAUER, *Nervus rerum austriacarum*; the second part relates to Thomas FELLNER – Heinrich KRETSCHMAYR – Friedrich WALTER (edd.), *Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung*, I–X vols. in 3 parts, Vienna 1907–1970, a towering achievement of intergenerational scholarship; on the Habsburg court now see Jeroen DUINDAM, *Vienna and Versailles. The Courts of Europe’s Dynastic Rivals, 1550–1780*, Cambridge 2003 (= New Studies in European History); IDEM, *The Habsburg Court in Vienna. Kaiserhof or Reichshof?*, in: R. Evans – P. Wilson (edd.), *The Holy Roman Empire*, p. 91–119.

³⁷ The state of research is summarised Gerhard AMMERER – et al. (edd.), *Bündnispartner und Konkurrenten der Landesfürsten? Die Stände der Habsburgermonarchie*, Wien 2007 (= Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung 49); for updated guidance see W. GODSEY, *The Sinews of Habsburg Power*, p. 1–36, quote on p. 17–18; on Lower Austria Shuichi IWASAKI, *Stände und Staatsbildung in der frühneuzeitlichen Habsburgermonarchie in Österreich unter der Enns, 1683–1748*, St. Pölten 2014 (= Studien und Forschungen aus dem Niederösterreichischen Institut für Landeskunde 53); on Moravia Jiří DAVID, *Moravské stavovství a zemské sněmy ve druhé polovině 17. století*, Folia historica bohémica 24, 2009, p. 111–165; IDEM, *Staatsfinanzen und Steuererhebungen in Mähren*, in: P. Rauscher (ed.), *Kriegsführung und Staatsfinanzen*,

characterised by the increasingly symbiotic relationship between the monarch and some form of representation of the body politic(s) that constituted the *social* sources of power.³⁸ This dichotomous approach is helpful in understanding the shifting dynamics between crown and estates, but at the same it raises more questions about the integrative characteristics and procedural particularities of *how* such states operated, as pointed out by Steve Hindle who maintained that “the state is not to be viewed exclusively as a set of institutions; rather, it is a network of power relationships which become institutionalized to a greater or lesser extent over time.”³⁹ This essay, then, is a first attempt to investigate “how certain forms of centralized and local power interact[ed] with one another”, thereby adding a new facet to the study

of the “complex relations between the varied bodies that made up the fractured polity” of the Austrian monarchy around 1700, and it does so seeking answers to the following questions.⁴⁰ If tax receipts in the Habsburgs’ nascent fiscal-military state went up thanks to improved “cooperation” among the ruling elites and their “consensus” to increase the subjects’ tax burden, one might as well ask *how* this was accomplished on the ground? On what kind of socio-economic and political foundations did this fiscal-military state rest, and was this achievement accompanied by comparable improvements in regional and local tax regimes? Or, more poignantly, was the nascent fiscal-military state accompanied by the emergence of a fiscal-military *lordship* to deal with the increasing tax pressures?

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p. 187–210; on Bohemia Petr MAŤA, *Wer waren die Landstände? Betrachtungen zu den böhmischen und österreichischen “Kernländern” der Habsburgermonarchie im 17. und frühen 18. Jahrhundert*, in: G. Ammerer – et al. (edd.), *Bündnispartner und Konkurrenten*, p. 68–89; IDEM, *Patres Patriae or Proditores Patriae? Legitimizing and De-Legitimizing the Authority of Provincial Estates in Seventeenth-Century Bohemia*, in: Balázs Trencsényi (ed.), *Whose Love of Which Country? Composite States, National Histories and Patriotic Discourses in Early Modern East Central Europe*, Leiden 2010, p. 405–442 (= *Studies in the History of Political Thought* 3); IDEM, *Bohemia, Silesia and the Empire. Negotiating Princely Dignity on the Eastern Periphery*, in: R. Evans – P. Wilson (edd.), *The Holy Roman Empire*, p. 167–183.

³⁸ W. GODSEY, *The Sinews of Habsburg Power*, p. 13–14, points implicitly to the Netherlands and explicitly to the British case; the ‘symbiosis argument’ can also be found in scholarship on early modern England, on which see Michael BRADDICK, *The early modern English State and the Question of Differentiation, from 1550 to 1700*, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38, 1996, p. 92–111; for more on England, see the overview by Steve HINDLE – Alexandra SHEPARD – John WALTER, *The Making and Remaking of Early Modern English Social History*, in: idem (edd.), *Remaking English Society. Social Relations and Social Change in early modern England*, Woodbridge 2013 (= *Studies in Early Modern Cultural, Political and Social History* 14), p. 1–40; the final part of the sentence refers also to Michael MANN, *The Sources of Social Power. A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*, New York 2012, especially 450–499, echoing, in a way, P. BERGER – T. LUCKMAN, *The Social Construction of Reality*; see also note 22.

³⁹ S. HINDLE, *The State and Social Change*, p. 19.

⁴⁰ J. BREWER, *Revisiting The Sinews of Power*, p. 34.

Taxing Southern Bohemians: The Eggenberg Domains of Krumau, 1650–1700

For years after its conclusion at Eisenburg (Vasvár), the short war of 1663/64 remained on the minds of the princely administrators, appearing for instance in a tax assignation that hails from well over a decade later that was issued to finally pay for “*provisions dating from 1664*” to the tune of more than 1,800 fl., payable to the “*Royal Circle Administration in Bechin [Bechyně]*”.⁴¹ The memory of these dire circumstances, however, was not restricted to the princely officials working in Krumau Castle; to the contrary, it remained very much on everyone’s minds – from the rolling hills of southern Bohemia to the imperial court – as a number of documents from the second half of the 1670s documents. Take, for instance, the fact that Eggenberg’s chief administrator Aßberg sent an emissary to traverse the bailiwicks of Melm (Jelm), Salnau (Želnavá), and Stein im Böhmerwalde (Polná na Šumavě), the demesne farm Weegerhof as well as to visit the market town of Oberplan (Horní Planá) to “*stay in these places until all out-*

standing contribution payments as of May” and to “*earnestly admonish the folk to pay up*”. The emissary was further instructed “*not to move from one place to another until the village judge promises to transmit the money as soon as possible or swears to pay the entire sum come next Wednesday [12 June 1675]*”.⁴²

Yet, as serious as these moments may appear, the headmen, judges, and subjects of these hamlets and villages were small fry compared to the much bigger problems Eggenberg and his administrators had to deal with a few years later in the context of the revisions of Bohemia’s tax cadastre. When the original *Berní rula* was compiled and promulgated in the 1650s, it re-affirmed Eggenberg’s domination over the city of Krumau as well as fiscally incorporated the two large Cistercian abbeys of Goldenkron (Zlatá Koruna) and Hohenfurth (Vyšší Brod) into the tax system of the princely domains. At first sight, this supports the traditional narrative of centralisation by means of fiscal integration, but in both instances, appearances are deceiving: as regards the former, over the second half of the seventeenth century, and due to the rapidly increasing tax

⁴¹ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Assignation, Krumau, 16 February 1675. The source is potentially misleading as the circle administrations were neither state institutions – as in that they were controlled by the crown – nor actually to be found in Bechin, but in the manors of the regional governors; there were two regional governors (one lord and one knight) elected by the diet, and their own officials carried out the administrative tasks of the circle. Not before 1751 did the circle administrations become state institutions; cf. Bohuslav RIEGER, *Kreisverfassung in Böhmen*, in: Ernst Mischler – Josef Ulbrich (edd.), *Österreichisches Staatswörterbuch. Handbuch des gesamten österreichischen öffentlichen Rechtes*, III (K–Q), Wien 1907, p. 250–271, here p. 259–60.

⁴² Quotes respectively from SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Execution concerning the bailiwick [Gericht] Salnau, Krumau, 31 May 1675; s.p., Execution concerning the Weegerhof, the market town of Oberplan as well as the bailiwicks Melm, Salnau, and Stein, Krumau, 10 June 1675 (emphases in the original).

burden, the city's arrears soon outgrew the magistrate's capabilities to pay taxes and service its debts. This led Eggenberg to ask the Royal Tax Office to keep the city's debts exempt from his other possessions to avoid being held personally liable. In several documents going back and forth between the prince, his administrators in Krumau, and his solicitor in Prague, this issue was discussed repeatedly during the last quarter of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, eventually resulting in considerably increased paperwork, which is also indicative of the complications of any clear-cut assumption of administrative streamlining via fiscal integration. In autumn 1701, the city's debts for which Eggenberg could be held liable exceeded 78,000 fl., most of which originated from the preceding five years only.⁴³ – To put this number into perspective: average annual tax returns from the duchy of Krumau between 1682 and 1701 amounted to about 31,400 fl. (median: c. 28,000 fl.), or between thirty-six and forty percent of the outstanding debts.⁴⁴

Eggenberg's chief administrator, Johann Prix, in a letter, suggested that his lord should cover these debts at least partially, "*otherwise it stands to reason that the clergy [the administrators of Goldenkron and Hohenfurth] may bring forth charges of*

disorderly conduct by our tax office... which may arouse suspicions at court and by other interested parties."⁴⁵ While Eggenberg heeded the advice, this did not make the problem go away, as much as he might have wished so. Less than three years later, in summer of 1704, and due to the continuous fiscal pressures of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), the city of Krumau was insolvent. The debt had piled up due "*to many outstanding contributions, extraordinary [taxes], and other positions levied by the diet in recent years*" and the resulting "*wide-spread, country-wide poverty*", in combination with the continued exigencies of war, had rendered the city's position untenable. Yet, even if Eggenberg assumed some of the city's liabilities, the facts remained crystal-clear: "*As far as we are concerned, it is the city of Krumau alone that is indebted and unable to pay its share [of the taxes demanded of it].*"

In closing his letter, the duchy's new chief administrator, Sebastian von Liebenhaus, asked the Royal Tax Office to acknowledge, again in writing, both the lord's authority over the city as well as Eggenberg's limited liability in this instance.⁴⁶ Eventually, this particular situation – the insolvency – came to the fore anew in the context of a large loan the diet borrowed

⁴³ The total debt from the period November 1696 to October 1700 amounted to 78.124 fl. 34 kr. 5 1/4 d.; SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 64, s.p., Debt Specification, Krumau, 2 November 1701.

⁴⁴ S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 165–238, especially Fig. 3.1 on p. 203.

⁴⁵ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 64, s.p., Johann Prix to Eggenberg, Krumau, 30 November 1701.

⁴⁶ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 64, s.p., Sebastian von Liebenhaus to the Royal Tax Office, Krumau, 14 July 1704.

from a group of Jewish creditors from Frankfurt am Main and Würzburg in 1706/1707, which caused the city of Krumau comparable problems of solvency and was finally resolved in 1709 by amending the wording used in the Royal Tax Office's receipts, which thenceforth were produced "*with the clause Salvo Iure incorporationis, that is, [the city is fiscally] separated from [Eggenberg's] domains.*"⁴⁷

Whereas the city of Krumau tried to get Eggenberg to cover at least a part of its arrears, the two above-mentioned ecclesiastical institutions, the Cistercian abbeys of Goldenkron and Hohenfurth, sought to undo their fiscal integration during the same time period. It all started in late December 1680 when Matteo Mattei, the collector of southern Bohemia's royal beverage tax, in a receipt, confirmed that the three breweries that existed within the dominions of the abbot of Hohenfurth – one near the abbey and the other two in Komarschitz (Komaříce) and Habern (Habří) – had not paid their beverage taxes via the ducal tax office in Krumau Castle, but instead transmitted the money *directly* to the responsible authority in Prague. Over the past three years, from 1 September 1677 to 31

August 1681, the abbey of Hohenfurth, despite having paid more than it should have, was violating Eggenberg's princely prerogatives.⁴⁸ That this incident became an issue in Krumau and Prague, however, was due to a procedural technicality: in response, Hohenfurth's abbot, Johann Claveo, pointed to the relevant sections of the resolution of the Bohemian diet stating that he had paid more in taxes than he should have. Addressed to the emperor, all of his imperial and royal councillors, the Statthaltere, and all other responsible instances and individuals, Claveo first acknowledged that the taxes levied on the abbey were within the range set out by the diet resolution, which held that Hohenfurth's annual beverage taxes should fall between 415 and 450 fl., but taking offence at being taxed at the top rate, then continued as follows: "*If your excellencies would come to the conclusion that this constitutes a fiscal wrong, and that therein I was taxed at too high a rate of 30 fl. or more, then I would humbly ask you Excellencies and Lordships to indulge me and my congregation... to duly remedy the above-mentioned error, and treat me befitting my own rank as envisaged in the resolutions of the Bohemian Diet.*"⁴⁹

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⁴⁷ The entire story of this loan arrangement is reconstructed by Stephan SANDER-FAES, *Staats-Desintegration in Praxis. Krieg, Kredit und Steuern in Böhmen unter Joseph I.*, *Český časopis historický* 117, 2019 (forthcoming).

⁴⁸ The annual taxes amounted to 450 fl., 415 fl., and 421 fl., respectively, for each of these beverage tax years commencing on 1 September and ending on 31 August respectively; SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L a, fasc. 62, s.p., Beverage Tax Receipt, Krumau, 26 December 1680; additional background on Hohenfurth's breweries in Dominik KAINDL, *Geschichte des Zisterzienserstiftes Hohenfurt [sic] in Böhmen*, Hohenfurth 1930, p. 78–79.

⁴⁹ Claveo's supplication most likely went directly to Prague as well; a copy is found among those documents the Statthaltere sent back to Krumau, which explains the slight dating discrepancies;

In doing so Claveo implicitly related his supplication to the diet resolution of 1663/64, which instituted the beverage tax in Bohemia after repeated requests by the Hofkammer. Appropriated for three years at first, this fiscal position eventually became a quasi-permanent, but fluctuating, part of the kingdom's tax system in the following decades while remaining, theoretically speaking, subject to consecutive renewal by the diet.⁵⁰ And herein lies the crucial detail: because of its impermanent character, the original diet resolution contained a clause that set a certain range of taxation, which was carried over into the subsequently renewed resolutions. It was based on an imperial declaration that allowed "*those members of the diet who so desire it...to be taxed at the minimal rate*", as the most recent resolution, adopted in 1678, held.⁵¹ It is in this seemingly innocuous detail that we are able to identify the root cause of the veritable avalanche of correspondence that engulfed Krumau, Hohenfurth, Goldenkron, Prague, and Vienna.

Despite outward appearances, Claveo managed to kill two birds with one stone: on the one hand, the diet resolution explicitly mentioned that there was a certain amount of leeway with respect to lower beverage tax rates. Yet in his implicit referral to the rest of the diet resolution – in particular to the proviso "*those members of the diet who so desire it*" – abbot Claveo also laid claim to sovereign standing as a full member of the kingdom's diet. Upon close inspection, and once additional documents pertaining to the then-ongoing revisions of the tax cadastre are considered, Claveo's intentions are revealed: both abbeys were sending their taxes directly to Prague because the provosts sought to take advantage of these revisions. In other words: they aspired to the full separation from the Eggenberg dominions – and this was perfectly clear to both the Prague-based Statthaltereie as well as to the duke of Krumau.⁵² While the former, only five (!) days later, responded to Claveo's supplication stating: "*that this piece of information,*

SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – čg, sign. I 4L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Supplication by Johann Claveo, Hohenfurth, 31 January 1681 (emphases in the original); Claveo pointed to the pertinent clauses that renewed the beverage tax in 1678 "in accordance with the *caveats* [*Clausul*, or *Clausulen*] and provisos [*Reservatův*, or *Reservaten*] contained in all prior diet resolutions [pertaining to this matter]"; cf. the Resolution of the Bohemian Diet, 1677–1678, printed in Prague, 16 June 1678, fol. xiii (emphases in the original); note that the squared parentheses reproduce the original wording in the Czech and German editions.

⁵⁰ Beverage taxes rose from c. 150,000 fl. (1657) to 380,000 fl. (1664), declined somewhat to less than 300,000 fl. (1700), before rising considerably during the following decades climbing from 500,000 fl. (1707) to 636,000 fl. (1724) and eventually reaching 700,000 fl. (1739); J. PEKAŘ, *České katastry*, p. 81–83, data on p. 82.

⁵¹ Resolution of the Bohemian Diet, 1677–1678, printed in Prague, 16 June 1678, fol. xiii.

⁵² Claveo set out to do so in (probably) 1679, as a copy of his legal arguments, transmitted to the Royal Tax Office (which was not responsible for the beverage tax) attests; see SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – čg, sign. I 4L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Memorandum by the Royal Tax Office concerning the status of Hohenfurth abbey, Prague, 20 June 1679; fulfilment of this aspiration

*including the correction and the formal details therein contained, has to be dealt with in the name of his grace (under whose immediate power the supplicant belongs), and has thus been forwarded to his princely grace of Eggenberg.*⁵³

Consequently, the Statthalterei then decreed that “*everything should remain as per ancient tradition [altes Herkommen]*” and informed Eggenberg that “*should he elect to remind [us] of anything*”, he would be very welcome “*to inform the Royal Statthalterei before too long.*” This decision was accompanied by copies of the documents Claveo had sent to Prague to support his case.⁵⁴ When he learned of the abbot’s activities in late January 1681, Eggenberg and his administrators recognised this entire sordid affair for what it apparently was: a carefully arranged, but not too-subtly executed, challenge to princely authority by means of administrative practices. Therefore, the prince immediately – on the very same day he received the correspondence – wrote a long letter to the Statthalterei. Picking up on their latter’s invitation

to comment on these matters, Eggenberg responded in no uncertain terms: “*Firmly rooted in well-established information, I herewith, and out of necessity have to, remind you that the ambition on part of the abbot and convent of Goldenkron stands in contradiction to both ancient tradition [altes herkommen] as well as the imperial and royal resolution dated 20 February in the year 1643...decreeing that both abbeys Goldenkron and Hohenfurth are not allowed to handle their fiscal matters separately from the lordship of Krumau.*”⁵⁵

This decision was further cemented into place during the general visitation (1653) when the abbey of Goldenkron had tried to be registered separately from Eggenberg’s possession; this, in turn, as the prince recounted, had caused “*a lot of confusion*” during the compilation of the tax cadastre two years later, but it was hardly a singular event.⁵⁶ Due to these long-standing ambitions by both abbeys, Eggenberg (and his administrators) understood the seemingly innocuous language used by Claveo only too well,

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eluded the abbots of Hohenfurth until 1822; cf. D. KAINDL, *Geschichte des Zisterzienserstiftes*, p. 112–113.

⁵³ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4L a, fasc. 62, s.p., Response by the Statthalterei, Prague, 31 December 1681 (emphases, incl. the double emphasis, in the original).

⁵⁴ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4L a, fasc. 62, s.p., The Statthalterei to Eggenberg, Prague, 31 January 1681.

⁵⁵ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4L a, fasc. 62, s.p., Eggenberg to the Statthalterei, Krumau, 31 January 1681 (emphases in the original).

⁵⁶ Eggenberg provides more insights in his letter: from the mid-1650s, when the abbot of Goldenkron acted as his legal guardian (Eggenberg was born in 1641) until 1666, all the abbey’s official dealings “*with respect to the Contributions and all other related grievances*” were filed “*under the title of the lordship of Krumau*”; after fire struck the convent’s possessions in 1666, however, the abbot of Goldenkron had petitioned the Royal Tax Office “*separately and deceitfully*”; *IBIDEM* (emphases in the original).

reiterating that “*the abbots of Goldenkron and Hohenfurth are not immediate prelates in the sessions of the diet*” and “*that nothing of this kind shall be permitted in the future.*”⁵⁷

Within a few days, Eggenberg's Prague-based solicitor, Dr. Nicolai, noted that Goldenkron was found to have been incorporated into the Eggenberg possessions only in 1655, which gave some credence to the abbey's claims. At the same time, however, he reassured Eggenberg, reporting that the Statthalterei had re-affirmed its previous decision that “*there will be no alteration introduced, everything shall remain as per ancient tradition [altes Herkommen], and that there will be no [further] discussion.*” Yet despite knowledge of this ruling, the abbot of Hohenfurth had petitioned the Tax Office in Prague directly to have his beverage tax reduced, again bypassing the proper channels. While the former was a legitimate complaint, the procedure itself was not; in Nicolai's words: “*both convents are under the immediate domination of your princely grace, and because of this both are deemed to be unable to act in a sovereign manner [salbige Zü kainem Standmäßigen actu ZueZulaßen seijen].*”⁵⁸ Both the chain of events and the abbots' activities are important, as Eggenberg's response a few days later reveals. Nicolai was instructed to affirm that in trying to pay their taxes improperly – and

to do so “*in a secretive manner [heimblicher waiß]*” – failure rested with the Statthalterei and the Royal Tax Office. In effect pointing fingers because the officials there should have known better, Nicolai was to implore the “*Royal Tax Office to act accordingly and issue an appropriate reprimand*” addressed to the abbot of Goldenkron, “*which at the same time should also be sent to the abbot of Hohenfurth as he, too, intended to violate the rules concerning payment of the beverage tax.*”⁵⁹

A few weeks later, the Statthalterei informed the emissaries of the abbot of Hohenfurth in person about its decision, yet, as Peter Putz, captain of Krumau Castle, and Eggenberg's tax official Johann Prix reported about a year later, the convent's insubordinate behaviour had not ceased. Despite the transmission of “*written information*”, Eggenberg's irritated administrators wrote, “*the abbey is not ashamed of making unsubstantiated claims, including defamatory statements, addressed to superior instances, whose [the unsubstantiated claims] merits, when discussed on an earlier occasion [Conferentz], had been found wanting in every single instance*”. The letter was accompanied by more documents to reinforce Eggenberg's position, which explicitly stated that “*neither abbot nor convent...suffered any difficulties, pressure, and oppression, as*

⁵⁷ IBIDEM (emphasis in the original); Eggenberg and his administrators listed a total of nine items, all of which were supported by the respective documentation; the correspondence itself was copied at least five times and it is reproduced in detail in S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 331–332.

⁵⁸ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Dr. Nicolai to Eggenberg, Prague, 5 February 1681.

⁵⁹ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Eggenberg to Dr. Nicolai, Linz, 13 February 1681 (emphases in the original).

they call it, that could be substantiated". To the contrary, if "anyone had been insulted", it was the prince of Eggenberg, "though these [insults] are hardly significant at all".⁶⁰ Putz' and Prix' report to the Bechin circle officials was accompanied by a number of documents that sought to both prove Eggenberg's point as well as to the crushing debt that "in these hard times" excessively burdened "the poor subjects" who were in dire need of support.⁶¹

By this time, however, the general situation had changed dramatically. In spring and summer 1683 the Ottoman host advanced seemingly irresistible towards the emperor's city of residence, Vienna, which prompted Leopold I to flee the soon-to-be besieged city.⁶² At the same time, it appears that the abbots' activities had formed a precedent of sorts: first, in March 1683, Eggenberg ordered Ladislav Krinner, inspector of economic affairs and ducal councillor, to enquire whether or not

the contributions of *the city* of Krumau "were paid apart and separately from the lordship to the Royal Tax Office."⁶³ This letter underscores that the activities by the two abbots discussed above were both about minutiae of paying taxes as well as related to their status within the Bohemian body politic and the fiscal integrity of the Eggenberg domains. As the Ottomans advanced closer to Vienna, this interrelationship becomes even more apparent, as a second letter from Eggenberg indicates: to counter the threat, extraordinary wealth taxes were levied on Bohemia. Technically, these "*Turkish and wealth taxes*" were ordered by Leopold I in Laxenburg Castle on 3 May 1683, and subsequently imposed by the Statthaltereie, bypassing the diet's rights to appropriate taxes. Yet the abbots of Hohenfurth and Goldenkron, "citing ancient tradition [*altes herkommen*], refused to contribute [their share] to the lordship, and referred to their [rank as] royal

⁶⁰ This paternalistic magnanimity, though, was very much calculated, as the letter follows-up on this statement with the request not to punish the lordship – and its subjects – by ordering troops to march through the Eggenberg possessions and/or quartering troops there; SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4L a, fasc. 62, s.p., Peter Putz and Johann Prix to the Bechin Circle Officials, Krumau, 17 March 1682 (emphases in the original);

⁶¹ Putz and Prix again mention that "only yesterday [16 March 1682] they *swore* [*assenta*] that from time immemorial, and all the time, the *contributions* from this [Hohenfurth] and Goldenkron abbeys were paid to Krumau Castle"; *IBIDEM* (emphasis in the original); for the documentation see SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4L a, fasc. 62, s.p., Hohenfurth's Debts, Krumau, 16 March 1682; *IBIDEM*, s.p., Further Particulars on Hohenfurth's Debts, Krumau, 15 January 1677; extensive transliterations of the original sources available in S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 334–335.

⁶² See Martin SCHEUTZ, 1683 – *Zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens. Internationale Konflikte, beginnende Zentralisierung der zusammengesetzten Habsburgermonarchie und Konfessionalisierung*, in: idem – A. Strohmeier (edd.), *Schlüsseljahre österreichischer Geschichte*, p. 111–134, incl. bibliography.

⁶³ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4L a, fasc. 62, s.p., Eggenberg to Ladislav Krinner, Krumau, 18 March 1683 (emphasis in the original); on Krinner see S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 507.

lords [königliche herren].” Thus, forcing Eggenberg’s hand, the duke of Krumau declared that “*in this extraordinary case, and irrespective of the above-mentioned prelates mentioning [their wrong] rank*”, he was putting monarch and Christendom first. In closing, Eggenberg asked “*His imperial and royal majesty, in good measure and once the difficulties with the clergy have been put aside, not to refrain from reflecting on this*.”⁶⁴

This declaration was accompanied by a letter written by two of Eggenberg’s officials that reveal not only the prevailing mood in and around Krumau Castle, but it also demonstrates the impossibilities that were asked of both administrators and the tax-paying subjects. In an order dated 7 May 1683, Bechin circle officials demanded that the extraordinary taxes for both April and May – an anticipation that totalled 3,304 fl. – must be consigned within ten days, yet Johann Prix and Lorentz Torkowitzer pointed to the “*impossibility, [and] that this [resulted] in asking twice as much, but at once, from the already hard-pressed contributors*,” which is why they asked for an extension of the deadline.⁶⁵ Only two days later, circle officials responded that there would not be any grace period due to “*the highest possible threat...[and] thus the entire sum for April*

and May is due on the 20th of this month [May]”, which in effect meant that the Eggenberg administrators were given only an additional three more days to “*consign the money...failure to comply, and of this you may rest assured, will result in military confiscations without either delay or restraint*.”⁶⁶

These instances suggest two intimately intertwined, but also contradictory, developments: on the one hand, war-induced pressures reduced the latitude enjoyed by regional and local officials as strategic considerations increasingly overrode non-essential issues and established practices. Those matters that pertained to the continued conduct of war – “*money is the sinews of war*”, with Cicero – were increasingly prioritised while all other matters, including ancient rights and concerns for the subjects’ well-being, receded. While it certainly was among the lords’ priorities to protect his or her subjects from foreign invasion, yet we must not underestimate the pressures of such rapidly and immediately increasing fiscal pressures. In practical terms, both the “Great Turkish War” (1683–1699) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) led to a drastic increase in both taxation and spending, which in and of itself can be considered a noticeable achievement of the Habsburg monarchy. Yet, at the same time,

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⁶⁴ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Declaration by Eggenberg, Vienna, 15 May 1683 (emphases in the original).

⁶⁵ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Johann Prix and Lorentz Torkowitzer to Johann Koniaß, Krumau, 15 May 1683 (emphasis in the original).

⁶⁶ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Johann Koniaß to Johann Prix and Lorentz Torkowitzer, Neuhaus (Jindřichův Hradec), 17 May 1683 (emphases in the original).

an in-depth look at *how* exactly this was accomplished in the Habsburg monarchy's richest "metropolitan province", provides a complimentary account to the standard, Vienna-centric, histories of *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, on the other hand.⁶⁷ In addition, these episodes also serve as a reminder that this power-political change rested to a large degree on the backs of the hard-pressed and over-taxed subjects. Acknowledgement thereof, and reconstruction of the minutiae how this was done, goes beyond the majority of studies that focus, rather uni-dimensionally so, on the monarchs and the estates; while the ruling elites, in close collaboration with each other, were firmly in the driver's seat, the carriage was pushed and pulled forward by those without any say in the direction taken.⁶⁸

The dispute between the two abbeyes and the duke of Eggenberg, then, is best understood as a conflict whose characteristics suggest no obvious break with

ancient traditions and traditional social and legal circumstances. To the contrary, they were typically improvised, resulted in considerable additional paperwork, and increased the administrative burden at a time when the exigencies of war were certainly calling for more streamlining. Sure, there were improvements "around 1700 and in the first decade of the eighteenth century", as Thomas Winkelbauer recently wrote, listing a number of issues such as the establishment of the Vienna City Bank, decreased interest rates, and "a few other modernisations with regard to Austrian state finances, without which it most likely might have been impossible to achieve at least some of the war aims of the War of the Spanish Succession". All told, Winkelbauer holds the reign of Joseph I (r. 1705–1711) as "no less significant than...the better-known reforms after 1749", calling them "a modernising leap [*Modernisierungsschub*]".⁶⁹ Yet it is in statements such as these that we are able

⁶⁷ Cf. H. BOWEN, *Elites, Enterprise, and the Making*, p. 154–155; A. MACKILLOP, *Subsidy State or Drawback Province?*, p. 181; see also note 10; additional background by T. WINKELBAUER, *Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht*, vol. I, p. 449–529, especially p. 487–529; IDEM, *Nervus rerum austriacarum*, 193–212; IDEM, *Krieg und Herrschaftsverdichtung*, p. 47–50; the reference above derives from M. HOCHEDLINGER, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*.

⁶⁸ Most accounts of state formation do (sort of) acknowledge this, but the perspective remains firmly focused on 'the state', which is usually treated as an abstract, almost reified actor unto itself, which in and of itself is also highly questionable assumption; see, e.g., CHARLES TILLY, *Reflections on the History of European State-Making*, in: idem (ed.), *The Formation of the National State in Western Europe*, Princeton, N.J. 1975 (Studies in Political Development 8), p. 3–83, especially 48–50; PETER B. EVANS – DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER – THEDA SKOCPOL (edd.), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge–London 1985; MARTIN VAN CREVELD, *The Rise and Decline of the State*, Cambridge 1999, p. 126–355; more awareness of the composite, direct, and personal nature of 'the state' can be found in the essays in WOLFGANG REINHARD (ed.), *Power Elites and State Building*, Oxford 1996 (= *The Origins of the Modern State in Europe*); and IDEM, *Geschichte der Staatsgewalt*, p. 305–479; see also notes 15, 22, and 38.

⁶⁹ THOMAS WINKELBAUER, *Die Habsburgermonarchie vom Tod Maximilians I. bis zum Aussterben der Habsburger in männlicher Linie, 1519–1740*, in: idem (ed.), *Geschichte Österreichs*, Stuttgart 2015, p. 159–289, quotes on p. 196–197.

to observe the analytical and interpretative limitations of a one-point perspective, in particular as the initiatives undertaken by both Joseph I and his successor, Charles VI (1711–1740), “appear to have had little tangible effect, and grave budgetary weaknesses remained”. Neither did the Habsburg emperors resort to cameralist ideas nor to more entrepreneurial-minded proponents of reform, to say nothing “of institutional reform in Bohemia”, as R.J.W. Evans emphasises.⁷⁰

Seen in this light, developments in Bohemia around 1700 can hardly be associated with the former interpretation. This latter view is also supported by the eventual resolution of the conflict between Eggenberg and his two ecclesiastical adversaries. In the immediate aftermath of the discussions above, these conflicts at first recede in prominence, most likely due

to the exigencies of the “Great Turkish War”, the increasing fiscal demands associated with it, and the procedures of the then-contemporaneous revisions of the tax cadastre around 1680.⁷¹ Promulgated and introduced in 1683, the fiscal incorporation of both abbeys into the Eggenberg possessions was upheld by a diet resolution and underwritten by newly issued administrative guidelines about the implementation of the revised cadastre.⁷² Yet, and despite previous efforts having come to naught however argued for, the abbots of both Hohenfurth and Goldenkron continued to seek their convents’ expropriation. Appealing to Bohemia’s Supreme Chancellor Franz Ulrich Kinsky in 1687, they even produced new evidence gleaned from the archives of the lords of Rožmberk in Wittingau, the previous owners of the duchy of Krumau.⁷³ The abbot of

⁷⁰ R. EVANS, *The Habsburgs and Central Europe*, p. 13; support for this contrarian view can be found in, e.g., Charles W. Ingrao, *In Quest and Crisis. Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg Monarchy*, West Lafayette, Ind. 1979, p. 215–226; R. EVANS, *The Making of the Habsburg monarchy*, p. 155–308; in addition, research on the French efforts *at the same time* yields a comparable view, in fact, as historians are actually using *literally identical* metaphors for both the French and Austrian monarchies: both are said to resemble the “great image” of Nebuchadnezzar’s dream, but, as Guy Rowlands with respect to the former and Michael Hochedlinger as regards the latter maintain, these giants rested “on feet of clay”; quotes from Daniel 2:31–33 (KJV); Guy ROWLANDS, *The Financial Decline of a Great Power. War, Influence, and Money in Louis XIV’s France*, Oxford 2012, p. 36; M. HOCHEDLINGER, *Austria’s Wars of Emergence*, p. 7; the proverbial similarities, however, do not end there, as both G. ROWLANDS, *The Dynastic State*, p. 10 (quoting Peter CAMPBELL, *Power and Politics in Old Régime France, 1720–1745*, London 1996, p. 25), as well as Michael Hochedlinger (as before, p. 7) also use the term “*trompe-l’œil*” to emphasise this point (emphases in the original).

⁷¹ J. PEKAŘ, *České katastry*, p. 4–56, on the changes see p. 24–38, on the modified cadastre p. 38–56, p. 101–56; see also P. MAŤA, “*Unerträgliche Praegravation*”, p. 162–172, on the revisions p. 161–162.

⁷² Resolution of the Bohemian Diet, 1682, printed in Prague, 13 January 1683, fol. xxix–xxxiii (German ed.), fol. xxiii–xxvi (Czech ed.); SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Guidelines with Respect to the New Contribution, Krumau, 17 September 1683.

⁷³ These documents include a repartition dating from 1549, which was given in evidence to prove that both abbeys were of equal rank to the lordships of Krumau and Wittingau; SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 63, s.p., Repartition, Hohenfurth, 24 April 1547,

Hohenfurth renewed his case based on a receipt from 1600, which itself rested on a privilege from three years earlier, and asked “*for the [fiscal] separation of the convent from the lordship of Krumau.*”⁷⁴ After careful and extended deliberations within the emperor’s inner circle, however, Kinsky finally responded in summer of 1693, handing down Leopold I’s decision: all of Claveo’s arguments were rejected while at the same time all ducal prerogatives and duties were re-affirmed, specifically mentioning that Eggenberg’s role as “*protector [Schutz Collatur (sic)] and holder of jurisdiction*”. With respect to the evidence from the Rožmberk archives, the imperial decree held that in no way did this privilege intend to “*excorporate [Hohenfurth] with respect to payment of contributions, to the contrary, all financial levies as ordered by either king or country [the diet] are explicitly excluded and exempted, which is also supported by a wide variety of ducal documents, correspondence, and receipts; it has been clearly proven that since the year 1537 that the convent’s contributions were*

consigned to Krumau Castle, added to the lord’s taxes, and from thence [transferred] to the Royal Tax Office in Prague.”⁷⁵

Leopold I’s decision thus ended Claveo’s aim of excorporation and contained three points: first, the decree confirmed Eggenberg’s leading role “*in the repartitioning of taxes, the quartering of troops, &c.*”, although in all fiscal matters pertaining to the convent, a representative of Hohenfurth was to be present. Second, while all original receipts issued by the Royal Tax Office were to remain in Krumau Castle, authenticated copies were to be forwarded to Hohenfurth, which further underscores the abbey’s status as incorporated entity. At the same time, third, the decree reaffirmed the convent’s licensing privilege with respect to its brewery in Höritz (Hořice na Šumavě), which also serves as a reminder that the abbot’s claims were initially derived from Bohemia’s beverage tax, to which this entire affair remained, however loosely, connected at all time.⁷⁶

This outcome thus added to, not reduced, the complexity of the Bohemian

“transferred from the true Bohemian [Czech language]”, translated and notarised in Wittingau, 20 January 1689; s.p., Copy of the Original Compilation, Hohenfurth, 7 June 1537, translated and notarised in Wittingau, 28 January 1689.

⁷⁴ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4L a, fasc. 63, s.p., Receipt of the 600th Property Tax, Vienna, 18 October 1600, translated and notarised in Wittingau, 28 January 1689.

⁷⁵ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4L a, fasc. 63, s.p., Imperial Decree with respect to Hohenfurth, Vienna, 11 August 1693 (emphases in the original); extensive transliterations of the original sources are available in S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 337–340; this privilege by Petr Vok of Rožmberk is not mentioned in the convent’s history by D. KAINDL, *Geschichte des Zisterzienserstiftes*, p. 53–56, p. 78–79; note also that the older literature suggests that this particular decree occurred two years earlier, as per M. MUTSCHLECHNER, *Die Fürsten von Eggenberg*, p. 112–113.

⁷⁶ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4L a, fasc. 63, s.p., Imperial Decree with Respect to Hohenfurth, Vienna, 11 August 1693.

fiscal system, and similar increases can also be observed in a number of other sources detailing, for instance, the rise in contribution arrears and the similarly increasing attempts to offset them against current and future tax demands, comparable discussions in Krumau Castle about current and future requisitions by troops, and the large amount of documents in which Eggenberg and his administrators discuss matters pertaining to individual subjects.⁷⁷ Or, to mention just one other instance, albeit very briefly, in the misfortunes that befell the Poor Clares in the city of Krumau during in the first decade of the eighteenth century. In the context of Joseph I's escalation of both the War of the Spanish Succession and the fight against the contemporaneous insurrection in Hungary led by Ferenc Rákóczi, which erupted in 1703, demand for revenues spiralled out of control. Five years later, the cracks in the Habsburg monarchy's fiscal-financial regime had

become too visible to ignore: increasing fiscal pressures since the outbreak of the "Great Turkish War" a generation earlier and the gradual exhaustion of the tax-paying subjects' capabilities to keep up with the exigencies of war had become too big to ignore. In 1708 Krumlovian Poor Clares petitioned Eggenberg to "*show mercy and forward...this petition to His Majesty, including your recommendation*". Never before in its 400-year history had the convent had to face a comparable existential threat, abbess Beatrix wrote to Eggenberg, but if taxation levels do not recede soon, "*especially all those successive extraordinary levies, my convent's ruin is all but assured*".⁷⁸ Between 1705 and 1708 alone, the Poor Clares' arrears amounted to more than 7,300 fl., yet the nuns' annual revenues barely reached 600 fl. Faced with this existential threat, abbess Beatrix had no choice but to ask for the forgiveness of these arrears, but not of current or future tax demands.⁷⁹ Yet neither

⁷⁷ On the first issue, see, e.g., SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 64, s.p., Assignment, Krumau, 30 December 1704; on the second topic, provisions of "accommodation (*Dach und Fach*)" and *Service* (light, wood, salt, and bed)", cf. M. HOCHEDLINGER, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, p. 131, and, e.g., SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, s.p., Execution Letter, Krumau, 31 May 1675; fasc. 63, s.p., Execution Letter, Wesseli an der Lainsitz (Veselí nad Lužnicí), 31 October 1700; fasc. 64, s.p., Rescript by Eggenberg in Case of an Execution, Krumau, 13 January 1706; on the third issue, the case of Gregor Daubsky is paradigmatic with respect to clear-cut assumptions of integration via fiscal centralisation: Daubsky appeared repeatedly in the correspondence between the mayor of Budweis (České Budějovice), Frantz Pruntaus, and Eggenberg's tax official, Johann Prix; Daubsky had both payment difficulties as well as marriage problems – but there are two reasons as to *why* he appears in these records: first, because of his inability to pay the anticipated sums as taxes doubled from one month to the next, and second, because Daubsky was one of Eggenberg's subjects, but the *osedlý* assigned to his house was incorporated into the fiscal regime of the city of Budweis; cf. S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 341–349.

⁷⁸ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 65, s.p., Beatrix Windterischin to Eggenberg, Krumau, 26 August 1708 (emphases in the original); s.p. Petition by the Poor Clares, Krumau, 26 August 1708.

⁷⁹ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – čg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 65, s.p., Documents enclosed to the Petition, Krumau, 26 August 1708

the imperial court in Vienna nor the Royal Bohemian Deputation in Prague provided any relief whatsoever.⁸⁰ By spring 1709, the Poor Clares were reduced to appeal to their protector, Eggenberg, who in return asked both his solicitor and his chief administrator, Sebastian von Liebenhaus, to come up with any suggestions.⁸¹ Both officials, however, pointed to the only remaining option: the partial assumption of the Poor Clares' debts by Eggenberg; yet, it is hardly surprising that Eggenberg did not commit to any such thing (at least in writing as no additional documents thereto exist in the extensive records that deal with the potential consequences of these suggestions).⁸²

The Fiscal-Military State, War, and Consequence: a Fiscal-Military Lordship?

What, then, can we make of these examples? They might, certainly, serve as vignettes of the complexities and idiosyncrasies of early modern monarchies whose ambitious protagonists required more

and more money to wage war, which in turn fed into the eventual establishment of increasingly intricate fiscal-financial arrangements: state expenditures and the army marched in lockstep, the military became better organised and administered, and tax receipts rose as well, in part due to the conquest of Hungary and Transylvania and changes in the allocation of fiscal resources. In addition, recent research revealed the importance of the territorial estates in the improvement of the Austrian monarchy's fiscal-financial-military constitution.⁸³

But there is another picture we can paint of these same developments, the one sketched in this essay. Like virtually everything else – from European monarchy in general to kingdoms and lands governed by the Habsburgs to individual lordships – Bohemia's taxes were equally “composite” in nature and consisted of a variety of different categories.⁸⁴ Between the 1650s and 1700, the diet's appropriations increased by a factor of four

⁸⁰ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4L a, fasc. 65, s.p., Johann Georg von Matzberg to Eggenberg, Vienna, 5 September 1708; s.p., Johann Georg von Matzberg to Eggenberg, Vienna, 12 September 1708; for the official reply see s.p., Johann Wenceslaus Wratislaw von Mitrowitz to the Poor Clares, Vienna, 8 November 1708; the Poor Clares then appealed to the Bohemian instances, for which see s.p., Petition by the Poor Clares Addressed to the Royal Deputation, Krumau, 31 January 1709; and Egenberg's letter of support, s.p., Eggenberg to the Royal Deputation, Vienna, 16 February 1709.

⁸¹ SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – čg, sign. I 4L a, fasc. 65, s.p., Eggenberg to Sebastian von Liebenhaus, Vienna, 13 April 1709; s.p., Eggenberg to Johann Zenker, Krumau, 22 June 1709.

⁸² For an extensively documented account of this episode, cf. S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 285–291.

⁸³ Summarised by T. WINKELBAUER, *Krieg und Herrschaftsverdichtung*, p. 37–60; on the territorial estates' role W. GODSEY, *The Sinews of Habsburg Power*; see also notes 37 and 38.

⁸⁴ Cf. J. PEKAŘ, *České katastry*, p. 24–26, further details on p. 57–66; consider the characterisations of the Habsburg monarchy, which Evans determined to have been “a mildly centripetal agglutination

to six over the course of a mere half-century, and they did so by both raising existing taxes as well as introducing a number of additional and extraordinary positions.⁸⁵ Reconstruction of the Eggenberg possession's fiscal history suggests that military contributions alone were not responsible for this drastic rise in tax receipts; between 1682 and 1701, the number of individual tax positions rose from sixteen due dates per year (1682 through 1691, consisting of monthly contributions

plus four additional positions) to twenty-two due dates over the course of the seventeenth century's last decade. During these trying decades, the princely tax office administered the twelve instalments of the monthly contributions – 240 tax positions over twenty years – as well as 144 of these so-called *Terminsteuern*, bringing the total to 384 tax positions.⁸⁶ All of these were administered, paid for, and cleared individually.

Figure 3: Due-dates, Lords, and Villagers, 1682–1701

	Contribution ^a	T > Lord ^b	T > Market Towns ^c	T > Subjects ^d	Totals ^e
No. of T ^f	240	45	37	62	384
Totals ^g	398,736	136,501	7,628	84,919	620,193
Share ^h	63.5	22	1	13.5	100

Sources: SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vú – ěg, sign. I 4 L a, fasc. 62, 63, and 64, s.p., Overview of Taxes Paid, 1682–1701, Krumau, s.d.; cf. S. Sander-Faes, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 203, p. 231–234; all monetary values in fl.

- (a) Number of due dates and money equivalents deriving from the monthly contributions, which rested exclusively on the subjects.
- (b) Number of due dates and money equivalent of *Terminsteuern* (T) paid for by Eggenberg.
- (c) Number of due dates and money equivalent of *Terminsteuern* paid for by the market towns within the Eggenberg domains.

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of bewilderingly heterogeneous elements”, and which these days – much like Russian matryoshka dolls, but with a certain Brunnerian twist – is labelled a “composite state consisting of composite states”; quotes respectively from R. EVANS, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 447; Thomas WINKELBAUER, 1526 – *Die Entstehung der zusammengesetzten Monarchie der österreichischen Linie des Hauses Habsburg*, in: M. Scheutz – A. Strohmeyer, *Schlüsseljahre österreichischer Geschichte*, p. 59–78, here p. 59.

⁸⁵ Taxes rose from between 300,000 to 500,000 fl. in the 1650s to between 1.8m (1697/98) to 2.3m fl. (1700); cf. J. PEKAŘ, *České katastry*, p. 57–69; P. MAŤA, “Unerträgliche Praegravation”, p. 162–172; J. BÉRENGER, *Les Habsbourg et l’argent*, p. 163–382, especially p. 261–273; see also note 31.

⁸⁶ Numbers are the annual aggregates consisting of 12 instalments of the military contributions plus 4 *Terminsteuern* (1682–1691, with the exception of 1685, which saw 8 *Terminsteuern*); the median for this decade was 4 per year; there were 8 *Terminsteuern* in 1692 and 1693, 11 in 1694, 13 in 1695, 15 in 1696 and 1697, 9 in 1698, 11 in 1699, followed by 5 each in 1700 and 1701; the median for this decade was 10; S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 201–213.

- (d) Number of due dates and money equivalent of *Terminsteuern* paid for by the subjects.
- (e) Totals of due dates and money equivalents.
- (f) Gives the total number of due dates, divided between Eggenberg (Lord), market towns (Markets), and Subjects.
- (g) Gives the totals of the respective tax revenues.
- (h) Gives the share of the respective tax category relative to the amount of total tax paid.

To put these numbers into context, we need to differentiate between monthly military taxes, or contributions, and all other tax positions, or *Terminsteuern*. While the former increased by about a third between 1682 and 1701, these numbers pale in comparison to the latter category: both their annual incidence as well as their monetary value increased by a factor of sixteen to seventeen: four tax positions in 1682 yielded c. 1,548 fl., whereas fifteen tax positions in 1697 yielded c. 25,927 fl. Yet these totals can be somewhat misleading, and this becomes self-evident once questions about the social distribution of these resulting tax payments is taken into consideration. It is true that Eggenberg's share had amounted to a meagre two percent (1682) of the annual total, which increased to about forty-two percent in 1694; yet, it is equally telling that in 1699, the year that saw the highest amount of

tax receipts, the lord's share had again decreased to its two-decadal mean of about twenty percent. Here we note that the contributions, or military taxes, fell exclusively on the subjects, and in-depth analysis of these numbers tells a somewhat hidden, but nonetheless real, story of the exigencies of war. In 1682, for instance, contribution payments – that is, paid for by the subjects alone – amounted to c. 93 percent of the entire tax revenues stemming from the Eggenberg domains. The military tax' share dropped to below fifty percent during only four years (1694–1697) during the final two decades of the seventeenth century (see also Figure 2). At the same time, and because the subjects were also paying a considerable part of the extraordinary taxes, the lord's share of the total exceeded forty percent only once (1694), with Eggenberg's two-decade average remaining at around a fifth.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ Cf. *IBIDEM*, p. 165–238. Two words of warning here: first, the data analysed here treats all taxes as money of account (meaning payment in specie and kind as well as bookkeeping entries) that were funnelled through the seignorial administration in Krumau Castle, which includes a number of „additional tax grants” (*Nebenverwilligungen*); it does not, however, cover those amounts that were levied directly on individual property owners. On the former see S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 207–9, for details on the year 1697; note further that these „other” tax positions do appear every now and then in the correspondence when, e.g., Eggenberg in the context of the „Great Turkish War” argued that he and his wife were taxed an additional 7,200 fl. in wealth taxes to help fund the relieve effort of Vienna in 1683; SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – čg, I 4 L a, 62, s.p., Memorandum by Eggenberg, Vienna, 15 May 1683; see the transcription S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 336–7, n. 110. On these additional taxes levied on the property owners assembled in the diet, see P. MAŤA, „*Unerträgliche Praegravation*”, p. 167–8.

Figure 4: Social distribution of the tax burden, 1682–1701

	Contribution ^a	Terminsteuern ^b	T > Lord ^c	Σ = C + T ^d	ω > Lord ^e
1682	21,867	1,548	406	23,415	2
1683	22,937	2,436	1,058	25,373	4
1684	17,585	4,630	3,020	22,215	14
1685	16,061	8,220	3,962	24,281	16
1686	18,585	4,836	3,310	23,421	14
1687	17,784	4,851	3,310	22,635	14.5
1688	18,528	4,627	3,247	23,155	14
1689	17,782	4,603	3,107	22,385	14
1690	17,872	4,558	3,127	22,430	14
1691	18,144	4,387	7,606	30,988	25
1692	18,744	12,244	7,606	30,988	25
1693	18,060	12,862	8,331	30,922	27
1694	18,279	24,149	18,324	42,428	43
1695	18,460	27,371	19,046	45,831	43
1696	18,610	22,966	14,620	41,576	35
1697	18,904	25,927	12,393	44,831	28
1698	18,818	18,437	7,893	37,255	21
1699	27,300	25,902	10,566	53,202	20
1700	25,110	5,647	3,477	30,757	11
1701	29,306	8,847	6,501	38,153	17

Sources: SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – ěg, sign. I 4 L α, fasc. 62, 63, and 64, s.p., *Overview of Taxes Paid, 1682–1701, Krumau, s.d.*; cf. S. Sander-Faes, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 231–234; all monetary values in fl.

- (a) Totals of the yearly contributions.
- (b) Totals of the yearly *Terminsteuern*.
- (c) Amount of the *Terminsteuern* totals paid by Eggenberg.
- (d) Total amount of taxes, consisting of the sums of (a) and (b).
- (e) Share (ω) in percent of the total amount of the tax yield paid for by Eggenberg.

These numbers convey information about the monetary side of the Habsburg monarchy's fiscal regime in Bohemia, but the reconstruction of Eggenberg's tax history is also revealing in another way: there were no meaningful changes in bureaucratic practices in any of the instances involved, neither in Prague

(diet, Statthalterei; Royal Tax Office), the circle administrations, or in the individual lordships. It comes as no surprise, then, that the massive increase in individual tax grants by the diet, relayed by the other Prague-based institutions, and the continuation of time-honoured practices increased the complexity of the

fiscal administration, which in turn led to a growing backlog: each of these tax positions was administered and documented individually, and each of the respective quitclaims had to be signed and sealed by each of the four Supreme Royal Tax Collectors (*Oberste Steuer-Einnehmer, Neywysšý Bernicy, or Regni Bohemiae Supremus Quaestor*).⁸⁸ It is hardly surprising that the massive increase in individual tax positions led to a corresponding rise in

delays between assigning a tax position, receiving payment, and issuing the quitclaim: around 1680, the number of days elapsed between the tax assignment and the issuance of its receipt averaged around fifty days; by the 1690s, it took already twice as long, and during the War of the Spanish Succession the cumulative effects of these developments resulted in delays in excess of three hundred (average) to four hundred (median) days.⁸⁹

Figure 5: Delays in Tax Payments, 1675–1709

	No. of Sources ^a		Elapsed Time in Days ^b	
			median	average
1675–79	31 A	31 Q	49	55,4
1680–84	20 A	26 Q	54,5	54
1685–89	23 A	33 Q	48	61,5
1690–94	17 A	33 Q	120	120
1695–99	32 A	41 Q	110	160
1700–04	18 A	32 Q	136,5	224
1705–09	27 A	29 Q	443	339

Sources: SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Vů – ěg, sign. I 4 L a, fasc. 62, 63, 64, 65, and 66; cf. S. Sander-Faes, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 316–319.

- (a) No. of sources in the tax records; A = assignment; Q = quitclaim, or receipt.
 (b) Time elapsed (in days) between the assessment notice on the amount of tax due issued by the Eggenberg administrators and the issuing of the respective quitclaim.

⁸⁸ The Royal Tax Office in Prague consisted of one member of each of the diet's curia, that is of one cleric, lord, knight, and a representative of the royal towns, (s)elected by the diet; if need be, changes could be made in-between sessions of the diet. Both German and Czech titles derive from primary sources, for the Latin translation see Ferdinand MIKOWEC, *Starožitnosti a památky země České*, Praha 1870, vol. I, p. 117; on the office see Petr MAŤA, *Landstände und Landtage in den böhmischen und österreichischen Ländern, (1620–1740). Von der Niedergangsgeschichte zur Interaktionsanalyse*, in: P. Maťa – T. Winkelbauer (edd.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1620–1740*, p. 345–400, here p. 394–395; P. Maťa, "Unerrgängliche Praegravation", p. 160–161, both instances incl. additional references.

⁸⁹ S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 311–328, note Figs. 12 and 12.1 on p. 316 and p. 318, respectively; see also the synthetic analysis of tax and other data on p. 445–466, especially Figs. 16 and 17 on p. 453 and p. 455, respectively.

Conclusions: The Composite Nature of Domination

This essay's foray into the interactions between centre and periphery, exemplarily undertaken from the vantage point of the latter, suggests the following conclusions. First, and with respect to state formation, historians and social scientists have long pointed to the integrative role of centralising fiscal-financial-military regimes in early modern monarchies, but most of these studies do so from the perspective of the centre. Studying identical events and developments from the point of view of the Eggenberg possessions in southern Bohemia during the second half of the seventeenth century also reveals *both* the "accomplishments of those exercising power, but [also] its effects and its limitations."⁹⁰ While the establishment of a distinctively Habsburg variety of a fiscal-financial-military regime around the turn of the eighteenth century made possible the emergence of the Austrian monarchy as a great power, we should be wary of drawing conclusions based on such a one-point perspective. Recent research on both the imperial court and the role of the territorial estates revealed that there, as elsewhere, was a high degree of "cooperation" and "consensus" among the monarch's

privileged orders, which allowed for the establishment of a fiscal-financial-military regime comparable Europe's other powers, but this was done *à l'autrichienne*.⁹¹ That said, this does not mean that the territorial estates were offered much of a choice in these arrangements, and neither "cooperation" nor "consensus" between monarch and nobility should obscure the exploitation of the subjects by their landlords and the widespread poverty among the rural lower classes, as was noted by a number of travelling contemporaries such as the French cleric Casimir Freschot or German adventurer and writer Karl Ludwig von Pöllnitz.⁹²

This essay, a case study focused on the Bohemian possessions of the Eggenberg family, asked about the concrete manifestations of such a fiscal-financial-military regime *outside* the centre, and in doing so provides a first look at these developments from the vantage point of the periphery. As has been shown, the prince of Eggenberg was among the kingdom's most important aristocrats, but that did not spare his subjects from the exigencies of seemingly perennial warfare around the turn of the eighteenth century. We note further that the drastic increase in tax revenues during these decades

⁹⁰ J. BREWER, *Revisiting The Sinews of Power*, p. 34.

⁹¹ This argument has been most forcefully espoused by W. GODSEY, *The Sinews of Habsburg Power*, especially p. 5–12, incl. additional references; see also notes 35, 36, and 37.

⁹² CASIMIR FRESCHOT, *Remarques Historiques Et Critiques Faites dans un Voyage d'Italie en Hollande dans l'Année 1704, Contenant les Mœurs, Interêts, & Religion, de la Carniole, Carinthie, Baviere, Autriche, Boheme, Saxe, & Des Electorats Du Rhin*, Cologne 1705, vol. I, p. 127–145, esp. p. 132–136; or KARL LUDWIG VON PÖLLNITZ, *Des Freyherrn von Pöllnitz Brieffe Welche Das merckwürdigste von seinen Reisen und die Eigenschaften derjenigen Personen, woraus die vornehmsten Höfe von Europa bestehen, in sich enthalten*, Frankfurt am Main 1738, p. 270–281, esp. 277–278.

was accomplished in the absence of any structural changes in their appropriation, organisation, and administrative practices as well as absent any meaningful economic development.⁹³ To the contrary, in-depth analysis of the tax records preserved in the Eggenberg archive suggests a combination of *local*, that is, at the level of individual lordships, *regional*, that is, within the kingdom of Bohemia, and *supra-regional* – the Habsburg monarchy at war – (dis-)connections. Drastically rising fiscal pressures found their expression in the rise of the subjects' indebtedness, increasing administrative and postal delays while at the same time domination's fragmentation was *adding* to, not reducing or streamlining, the institutional and social complexity on all levels, from the lordship via the circle administrations to the Prague-based institutions.⁹⁴

Hence, we can draw two main conclusions: on the one hand, reconstruction and analysis of the Eggenberg possessions' tax history documents the extent to which fiscal pressures emanating from Vienna and Prague caused both centralising effects as well as furthered the already existing fragmentation of traditional patrimonial domination. In other words: fiscal integration adds to, not reduces, institutional complexity in the Eggenberg domains of southern Bohemia. Whereas this statement might seem contradictory, one should be wary of treating this one case study as an aberration or outlier; to the contrary, if this happens in Bohemia's largest agglomeration of property titles, it seems reasonable to assume that similar developments can be identified elsewhere in the kingdom. On a more general level, and while that statement might seem

⁹³ Ivo PLECHÁČEK – Karol TRÍSKA, *Vývoj správy*, in: idem (edd.), Státní Archiv v Třeboni. Průvodce po archivních fondech, Prague 1958 (= Průvodce po archivních fondech 9), vol. II, p. 43–87; on economic developments see Eduard MAUR, *Die wirtschaftliche, soziale und demographische Entwicklung Böhmens, 1648–1740*, in: Walter Leitsch (ed.), Polen und Österreich im 17. Jahrhundert, Wien 1999 (= Wiener Archiv für Geschichte des Slawentums und Osteuropas 18), p. 68–108; IDEM, *Staat und (lokale) Gutsherrschaft*, IDEM, *Der Staat und die lokalen Grundobrigkeiten. Das Beispiel Böhmen und Mähren*, in: P. Maťa – T. Winkelbauer (edd.), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1620–1740, p. 443–453; on northern Bohemia see, e.g., Sheilagh OGILVIE, *Zur ökonomischen Welt der Untertanen in Böhmen. Eine Fallstudie zur Herrschaft Frydlant*, in: Markus Cerman – Hermann Zeitlhofer (edd.), Soziale Strukturen in Böhmen. Ein regionaler Vergleich von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Gutsherrschaften, 16.–19. Jahrhundert, Wien 2002 (= Sozial- und wirtschaftshistorische Studien 28), p. 145–173; on southern Bohemia see, e.g., Hermann ZEITLHOFER, *Flachs und lokale Ökonomie. Arbeitsbeziehungen und das Agrosystem im südlichen Böhmerwald (17. bis 19. Jahrhundert)*, in: Rita Garstenauer – Erich Landsteiner – Ernst Landthaler (edd.), Land-Arbeit. Arbeitsbeziehungen in ländlichen Gesellschaften Europas (17. bis 20. Jahrhundert), Innsbruck 2010 (= Jahrbuch für Geschichte des ländlichen Raumes 2008), p. 20–35; IDEM, *Besitzwechsel und sozialer Wandel. Lebensläufe und sozioökonomische Entwicklung im südlichen Böhmerwald, 1640–1840*, Wien 2014 (= Sozial- und wirtschaftshistorische Studien 36).

⁹⁴ This is further underlined by the corresponding increase of tax documents that mention key terms such as “debt”, “military”, “taxes”, “coercion”, etc. whose incidence rose in tandem with the above-mentioned developments; for their discursive analysis cf. S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 445–462, especially Figs. 15 and 17 on p. 449–450 and p. 455–556, respectively.

counterintuitive in an essay about state formation, we are reminded that “*there does not exist...a rigid alternative between the validity and lack of validity of a given order*”, as Weber maintained in *Economy and Society*: “*On the contrary, there is a gradual transition between the two extremes; and also it is possible...for contradictory systems of order to exist at the same time. In that case each is, valid precisely to the extent that there is a probability that action will in fact be oriented to it.*” There is, perhaps, no better example to illustrate these transitory characteristics of “Legitimate Order” than those archival documents that deal with fiscal arrangements in early modern European monarchies.⁹⁵ We are further encouraged to follow Brewer’s lead who recently maintained that “*state formation operates from the local and particular rather than from the top down, and the emphasis is not just on the accomplishments of those exercising power, but its effects and its limitations*”.⁹⁶

Recognition of both aspects, then, suggests to embrace the *composite* nature

of the late medieval and early modern manifestations of traditional patrimonial domination, or *Herrschaft*.⁹⁷ The term “composite domination” is proposed to denote any combination of the following aspects, which are neither mutually exclusive nor must all of them be identifiable at any given time; “composite domination” encompasses, first, the sum of all domination-related territorial contexts in any “ruling organization”, or *Herrschaftsverband*. It refers, second, to the “social relationship” between the lord and his or her subjects, including, third and *pars pro toto*, all jurisdictional aspects of said relationships while remaining cognisant of the potential diversity of each individual constituent part of the ruling organisation. Conceived as such, composite domination is thus, fourth, a social, socio-functional, and economic system that tied together the lord and his or her subjects in a variety of mutual obligations and rights transcending the overwhelmingly socio-economic considerations of “demesne lordship”.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Max WEBER, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, Berkeley 1978, p. 31–33, quote on p. 32.

⁹⁶ J. BREWER, *Revisiting The Sinews of Power*, p. 34.

⁹⁷ See the similar conclusion by the late medievalist Klaus Schreiner: “*Lordship in the late medieval and early modern period was...dominium compositum in nature, i.e., lordship consisted of various rights.*” Klaus SCHREINER, *Grundherrschaft – ein neuzeitlicher Begriff für eine mittelalterliche Sache*, in: Gerhard Dilcher – Cinzio Violante (edd.), *Strukturen und Wandlungen der ländlichen Herrschaftsformen vom 10. zum 13. Jahrhundert. Deutschland und Italien im Vergleich*, Berlin 2000 (= Schriften des Italienisch-Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Trient 14), p. 69–93, here p. 87 (emphasis in the original).

⁹⁸ On demesne lordship see Jan PETERS (ed.), *Gutsherrschaft als soziales Modell. Vergleichende Betrachtungen zur Funktionsweise frühneuzeitlicher Agrargesellschaften*, München 1995 (= Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft 2, 18); see also IDEM, *Gutsherrschaftsgeschichte und kein Ende. Versuch einer Auskunft zu aktuellen Ergebnissen und Schwierigkeiten in der Forschung*, in: Ernst Münch – Ralph Schattkowsky (ed.), *Festschrift für Gerhard Heitz zum 75. Geburtstag*, Rostock 2000 (= Studien zur ostelbischen Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1), p. 53–80; on the current state of research see Markus CERMANN, *Villagers*

In recognition of the particularities of the “administrative and regulative order”, we note, fifth, the communicative dynamics of the corresponding variety of “media of exchange” as well as, sixth, the natural environment of any territorial context as the primary locus of its inhabitants’ life conditions.⁹⁹ Here we further note that this latter aspect might be more relevant to the subjects and the princely administrators due to the often absent land-owner, which suggests, seventh, that domination in its

late medieval and early modern manifestation should thus be considered a hybrid of *real*, or actually existing, and *fictitious* components. Perhaps evoking Schrödinger’s Cat, this last characteristic also points to the necessity to incorporate into future analysis any number of appropriate spatio-temporal considerations – that is, time and space in all their multiple variations and combinations – to better account for the complexities of premodern life.¹⁰⁰

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and Lords in Eastern Europe, 1300–1800, Basingstoke 2012 (= Studies in European History), especially 1–9; cf. M. WEBER, *Economy and Society*, p. 63–68 (economic action).

⁹⁹ On the epistemological-sociological conceptions see Björn KRAUS, *The Life We Live and the Life We Experience. Introducing the Epistemological Difference between “Lifeworld” (Lebenswelt) and “Life Conditions” (Lebenslage)*, Social Work & Society 13, 2015, p. 1–9.

¹⁰⁰ If not noted otherwise, the quotes in this paragraph are from M. WEBER, *Economy and Society*, p. 26–28 (social relationship), p. 33–36 (types of legitimate order), p. 40–43 (communal and associative relationships), p. 46–48 (representation and mutual responsibility), p. 51–52 (administrative and regulative order), p. 53–54 (power and domination), p. 76–80 (media of exchange); cf. also S. SANDER-FAES, *Herrschaft und Staatlichkeit*, p. 104–113, especially p. 107–108.

Stephan Sander-Faes

Composite Domination and State Formation, 1650–1700

**Manorialism and the Fiscal-Financial-Military Constitution in Habsburg Bohemia
(Abstract)**

This essay examines the consequences of the wars of Leopold I. Whereas the diffusion of the “fiscal-military state” thesis transformed our understanding of central institutions over the past three decades, most studies focusing on early modern state development employ top-down perspectives. By contrast, I am interested in the interlinkages of war and taxation on the regional and local levels in one of the monarchy’s core lands, Bohemia, and how they relate to the ongoing processes of centralisation. Based on the premise that individual actions and structural developments entail differing consequences for central institutions and the geographically more remote areas, this essay argues that state integration in the centre was accompanied by decreasing of cohesion on and control over the lower administrative levels. The Eggenberg possessions around Krumau serve as the basis for an in-depth case study, out of which emerges that the establishment of the Habsburgs’ fiscal-financial-military regime led to added, not reduced institutional complexity due to the composite nature of traditional patrimonial domination, or *Herrschaft*.

KEY WORDS

Fiscal-military state; state formation; Habsburg monarchy; Bohemian lands; Seignorialism; composite domination